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ABSTRACT 
 The Enright Forgiveness Inventory (EFI) purports to measure a person’s 
level of forgiveness.  Now available in many languages, it joins the list of 
Western psychological inventories that have been exported to other cultures in 
the name of cross-cultural research.  Actually, this constitutes intercultural 
research, as one culture (or here, its inventory) interacts with another (here, the 
respondents).  For this study, back-translation and a questionnaire were used to 
evaluate the Mandarin EFI (MEFI) as a tool of intercultural research.  Chinese 
and Western cultural differences relevant to forgiveness were also examined.    
 Respondents were asked to provide Mandarin characters to match 
Enright’s definition of “forgiveness” and a definition of “tolerance”.  These were 
associated with selected characters, Chinese sayings, and MEFI items.  The 
resulting data show little consensus regarding respondents’ understandings of 
the definitions.  The characters prompted by the definitions varied widely, and 
the four characters most frequently suggested for each definition held two in 
common.  Of twenty-two MEFI items (there are 60), only four were identified (by 
a slim majority) to be connected to forgiveness.  A majority agreed with one of 
Enright’s major assumptions, but a majority disagreed with another.         
 Responses to Enright’s definition in general and to the MEFI items in 
particular show that the respondents’ understandings of forgiveness vary widely 
from Enright’s and that they do not consider the MEFI to be closely related to 
forgiveness.  Those who use the MEFI are in danger of proving true the Chinese 
proverb, “Two-thirds of what a person sees exists behind that person’s eyes”.   
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Chapter One 
 
TRANSLATING “FORGIVENESS” IN CHINA 
 
1.1  Ying letter, Yan explanation 
 
 In the ancient Chinese city of Ying, a man was writing to his friend, 
the Prime Minister of Yan.  As darkness fell, the man said to his servant, 
“Hold high the candle,” absentmindedly writing the words as he spoke 
them aloud.  
 Upon receiving the letter, the Prime Minister was puzzled by the 
reference to the candle, and finally interpreted the words to mean that 
Yan should be ruled in brightness, with able and virtuous officials holding 
the most important offices.  The king accepted his Prime Minister’s 
advice and Yan prospered.  (Adapted from Wang, 1991, 116.) 
 
 “Ying letter, Yan explanation” (郢书燕说—y-ng sh% y4n shu! ) is a 
Mandarin Chinese set phrase referring to a situation where meaning is twisted, 
where misinterpretation occurs.  Fortunately for the people of Yan, this 
misunderstanding yielded a positive result.  Misinterpretations generally produce 
problems, not prosperity.  The greater the geographical and cultural distances 
between “Ying” and “Yan,” the greater the potential for misunderstanding.  Since 
children in Canada, England, and New Zealand imagine that digging right 
through the earth will land them in China (Willinsky, 1998, 139), it is not 
surprising that there is a great deal of misunderstanding between the West and 
China—two cultures at the “opposite” ends of the earth.  This thesis will explore 
the validity of a forgiveness inventory designed by and for Westerners in the 
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United States that has been translated into Mandarin, and ask whether or not 
the data collected from Chinese respondents constitute “letters from Ying”. 
North American teachers working with China Educational Exchange 
(CEE) experienced a “Ying letter, Yan explanation” misunderstanding in their 
classrooms while teaching an English as a Foreign Language (EFL) lesson to 
their Chinese students.  The teachers were all using the curriculum, Students 
and teachers learn together, prepared by Dennette Alwine-Friesen (2000), a 
former CEE teacher with eight years’ experience teaching EFL in China.  The 
course is designed to teach basic English oral skills along with peace-building 
skills.  A Beijing conference held in 2001 included an evaluation session of this 
newly piloted curriculum.  The teachers who came from across China were 
generally very pleased with the curriculum, and reported enthusiastic student 
responses as well—with one notable exception.  At the evaluation session, 
teachers were surprised to discover that their students were not the only ones 
who had reacted unexpectedly to the lesson on forgiveness. 
Each teacher had been somewhat perplexed by the negative student 
reactions prompted by a story from South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, in which a frail black woman forgives the white police officer who 
had murdered her son and her husband.  Students criticized, in some cases 
vociferously, the woman’s actions.  The curriculum developer and the CEE 
teachers had all intended the lesson as not only an example of forgiveness, but 
also as an encouragement to practice forgiveness.  This goal was definitely not 
met; in fact, it had the opposite effect on students.  The North American 
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curriculum designer and the North American teachers had hoped to encourage 
their Chinese students to practice forgiveness, but the “Ying” lesson was 
misinterpreted by the “Yan” students. 
These students were not the first Chinese to puzzle over a Western 
example of forgiveness.  In the early 1900s, Missionhurst Fathers (Catholic 
missionaries) encountered Chinese mandarins  
. . . who were deeply moved by the Gospel and attracted to the person of 
Jesus but were baffled by the message to forgive.  They would say: “We 
accept gladly your preaching and teaching but this notion of forgiveness 
is too difficult.  We cannot live this sincerely.  It is too hard.” (Terga, 1999) 
 
Contemporary observers of China support this contention that forgiveness is a 
difficult notion.  While many question whether or not repentance is a necessary 
condition for forgiveness, repentance does often play a vital role in the granting 
or withholding of forgiveness, so forgiveness would be relatively more difficult in 
Chinese culture where, according to Zha (cf. Huo, 2003, 10),  
. . . nobody confesses sins. . . .  It has never been popular to 
acknowledge openly the wrongs you have done to others. . . .  Forms of 
confession. . . are neither encouraged nor expected. . . .  In fact, it's hard 
to talk about psychological issues in Chinese—the language just isn't 
well-equipped with words and expressions to discuss your inner demons.  
The common attitude is to leave the demons alone. (1995, 18) 
 
Chao, an evangelical Christian scholar, bluntly states, “Chinese people lack 
forgiveness.  Because there is no clear concept of sin and no atonement, there 
are few examples of forgiveness, except the concepts of forbearance [恕– sh*] 
and tolerance [忍–r7n]” (1998).  While Chao seems to suggest a close 
connection between the concepts of forbearance and tolerance and the concept 
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of forgiveness, Augsburger argues that there is a sharp contrast: “Forbearance 
requires only tolerance and indulgence in a virtual suspension of ethical issues; 
forgiveness demands the facing of justice, love, mercy, and the uncomfortable 
behaviour we call repentance” (1996, 115), so even Chao’s “few examples of 
forgiveness” are actually nothing of the kind.  (These brief comments of 
Augsburger and Chao may typify Western and Chinese attitudes toward 
forgiveness and tolerance and the distinction, or lack of distinction, between the 
two.)   
 If it is true that “this notion of forgiveness is too difficult”, that “nobody 
confesses sins”, and that “Chinese people lack forgiveness”, there is little to 
suggest that anything resembling the Judeo-Christian concept of forgiveness 
can be found in China, even though some claim that forgiveness “is a universal 
human virtue” (Cameron & Kaza, 2002, 33—unfortunately, the only proof cited 
is that “almost every day individuals offer forgiveness to others for offenses or 
affronts in their interpersonal relationships. Likewise, virtually every modern 
religious tradition advocates forgiveness.”  Italics are added—these qualifiers 
seem out of place in defending a “universal” virtue.)  Dr. Robert Enright makes a 
similar (and similarly unsubstantiated) claim: “Forgiveness is an element of all 
cultures” (Park & Enright, 2000, 359). 
 Enright, “the forgiveness trailblazer” (Cole, Mitchell, Monroe, & Laughlin, 
1999) and “the ‘guru’ of forgiveness” (Murphy, 2002, 41), is one of those who 
will be credited with sparking unprecedented academic interest in forgiveness.  
In 1985, Enright, along with graduate students, professors, and interested 
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people in the community, formed a think tank—the Human Development Study 
Group—at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.  In 1994, as an outgrowth of 
this group, the International Forgiveness Institute was established, and in 1995 
the University of Wisconsin-Madison hosted the National Conference on 
Forgiveness, the first conference on forgiveness held at an American university.  
In addition to a plethora of academic articles, Enright has published (with 
Fitzgibbons) a major study entitled Helping clients forgive: An empirical guide for 
resolving anger and restoring hope (2000), and has produced the Enright 
Forgiveness Inventory, which Enright (2001) claims is “the measurement tool of 
choice in forgiveness research.” 
 The Enright Forgiveness Inventory (EFI) was developed to measure 
interpersonal forgiveness according to this definition: “Forgiveness is a 
willingness to abandon one’s right to resentment, negative judgement, and 
indifferent behaviour toward one who unjustly injured us, while fostering the 
undeserved qualities of compassion, generosity and even love toward him or 
her” (Enright, Rique, & Coyle, 2000, 1).  The EFI is a 60-item, 6-point Likert 
inventory (ranging from “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly Disagree”) that purports to 
be “an objective measure of the degree to which one person forgives another 
who has hurt him or her deeply and unfairly” (Enright et al., 2000, 5).  The items 
are presented in three subscales: affect, behaviour, and cognition.  Respondents 
are asked to think about a person who has recently hurt them and then answer 
questions about how they currently feel about the person (“I feel _________ 
toward him/her), act toward the person (“Regarding the person, I do or would 
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_________”), and think about the person (“I think he or she is _________”).  
Within each subscale, there are ten positive items (e.g., #50: “I think he or she is 
a good person”) and ten negative items (e.g., #53: “I think he or she is a bad 
person”—Park, 1998, 135-136).  In scoring the items, negative items are 
reverse scored, resulting in total scores ranging from 60 (revealing a low degree 
of forgiveness) to 360 (a high degree of forgiveness).  Essentially, “the higher 
the score, the more forgiving is the respondent” (Park & Enright, 2000, 360). 
 “Valid versions” (Enright et al., 2000, 7) of the EFI are available in 
German, Brazilian-Portuguese, Hebrew, Korean, and Taiwanese (i.e., Mandarin 
Chinese, not the indigenous language of Taiwan).  This study will focus on the 
Mandarin Enright Forgiveness Inventory (MEFI).  As shown above, there is a 
question as to whether anything like Western forgiveness exists in China for the 
inventory to measure, and, as a result, whether or not it is valid to make a claim 
such as this one:  
U.S. participants have higher scores on most EFI subscales and the total 
score than those in. . . Taiwan.  The EFI score of 286, for example, for     
a. . . Taiwan participant means that he or she is more than one standard 
deviation above the mean, while the same score, 286, for an American 
participant means that he or she is average on forgiving.  (Park & Enright, 
2000, 361) 
 
A Taiwan participant, then, must score one standard deviation above the mean 
in Taiwan in order to be as forgiving as the average American, so Americans 
are significantly more forgiving than the Chinese in Taiwan—at least according 
to the EFI/MEFI. 
 While many Western assessment tools have been exported to other 
cultures in the name of cross-cultural research (i.e., “studies dealing with how 
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culture influences human behaviour”—Brislin, 2000, vii), these interactions 
between Western researchers/instruments and non-Western respondents 
actually constitute intercultural research: “studies of people from different 
cultures [here, a Western instrument and Chinese respondents] coming into 
contact and interacting frequently” (Brislin, 2000 vii).  This latter term also avoids 
the misleading imagery of cultures being monolithic, self-contained edifices 
between which one may actually “cross”, an image that Salmon Rushdie 
questions: “Do cultures actually exist as separate, pure, defensible entities? Is 
not mélange, adulteration, impurity, pick’n’mix at the heart of the idea of the 
modern, and hasn’t it been that way for most of this all-shook-up century?” 
(1999, A13).  Many Western researchers seem to use the terms “cross-cultural” 
and “intercultural” interchangeably, and this penchant for researchers to ignore 
the intercultural aspects of their own research is problematic.  In general, the 
implications and complexities of intercultural research have been ignored to the 
point that Dana (2002) decries the “unbridled exportation of assessment 
instruments internationally, often with inadequate translations or demonstrations 
of cross-cultural construct equivalence.”  The problem is exacerbated when the 
construct under consideration is a contested and “a morally charged concept 
[like] forgiveness [which] evokes discourses intersecting psychology, politics, 
philosophy, and religion” (Haaken, 2002, 188).  There are, indeed, many points 
of forgiveness upon which scholars disagree: forgiveness is always a virtue—or 
is it? (Downie, 1965; Anderson, 1997); forgiveness is supererogatory—or is it? 
(McGary, 1989; Benbaji & Heyd, 2001); forgiveness requires repentance—or 
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does it? (Wilson, 1988; Narayan, 1997); saying, “I forgive you” is an Austinian 
performative utterance—or is it? (Martin, 1953; Digeser, 2001); forgiveness 
precludes punishment—or does it? (Forward & Buck, cited in Freedman, 1998; 
Yandell, 1998); forgiveness belongs to the primary victim and secondary and 
tertiary forgiveness are not legitimate—or are they? (Wiesenthal, cited in Tutu, 
1999; Yancey, 1985); forgiveness requires reconciliation—or does it?  (Wilson, 
1988; Suderman, 1998); forgiving increases self-esteem—or does it? (Enright & 
Fitzgibbons, 2000; Anderson, 1997); forgiving is forgetting—or is it? 
(Huntington, cited in Lang, 1994; Morris, 1988); and finally, and this is the 
question most pertinent to this study, either forgiveness “seems to have the 
status of a cultural universal”, or “forgiveness is not a cultural universal” (Lang, 
1994, 114; Newberg, d’Aquilli, Newberg, & de Marici, 2000, 100).  While not 
attempting to settle these debates, this study will include a conceptual analysis 
of Judeo-Christian forgiveness and compare it with Enright’s definition, upon 
which the EFI is based.   
 Ransley is writing about people who share a common language when 
she notes that, “When people speak or write of forgiveness, they mean different 
things” (2004, 15).  If “forgiveness” is such a complex and nuanced concept in 
English, it should not be surprising if such an unstable concept, elusive as it is 
within one language, does not translate easily, if at all, into other languages.  In 
Mandarin, for example, “forgiveness” can be loosely translated into at least nine 
different characters, ranging from “yu2n li4ng” (原谅; for minor, unintentional 
slights) to “ku1n sh*” (宽恕; used rarely, and reserved for very serious matters).  
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This suggests that the concept of forgiveness may be even more unstable in 
Chinese culture than it is in Western culture.  That forgiveness is contestable in 
both cultures may not be reason enough to assume that the MEFI is as valid in 
Mandarin as the EFI may be in English. 
 Some question the validity of any instrument developed in culture X when 
it is applied in culture Y.  As Leung and Zhang (1995) observe, research studies 
are commonly exported from the West to non-Western countries in which the 
issues examined are, in many cases, of little or no relevance.  Researchers 
often implicitly assume full-score comparability among results from different 
cultures, even though “personality tests developed in one culture and translated 
for use in other cultures are likely to be insensitive to cultural differences and to 
produce distorted results” (Triandis & Suh, 2002, 137) and “some item bias 
studies have shown a substantial proportion of items to be biased, sometimes 
more than half of the items” (van de Vivjer & Leung, 1997, 278).  Several 
groundbreaking and venerated instruments have been shown to exhibit cultural 
bias, including Kohlberg’s Moral Judgement Interview (MJI—Vine, 1986), the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI—Cheung, Leung, Fan, 
Song, Zhang, & Zhang, 1996), Hofstede’s four culture dimensions (Chinese 
Culture Connection, 1987, 144) and the Big Five (Triandis & Suh, 2002,  
147-149). 
 Since “social science is Western in origin, practitioners, and 
instrumentation” (Chinese Culture Connection, 1987, 144), it is not surprising 
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that cultural biases appear when instruments such as these are applied in non-
Western cultures.  Kohlberg’s MJI, for example, reflects  
. . . a characteristically Western view of humans. . . as autonomous 
beings who, as moral agents, make free and rational choices. . . . [while] 
the Confucian (Chinese) view of human beings is quite different. . . .  The 
preferred mode of solving moral conflicts in China reflects this world view, 
one that emphasizes collective and reconciliative decision-making rather 
than individual choice, commitment, or responsibility, as in the West.  
(Huang, 1990, 31) 
 
One of Kohlberg’s moral dilemmas (involving whether or not a 14-year-old boy 
should turn over the summer camp money he earned from his paper route when 
his father asks for it to go on a fishing trip) includes such obvious non-universals 
as “summer camp”, “paper route”, and “fishing trip”.  Of course, these details of 
the story could be adapted to Chinese culture by substituting “books”, “h@ng b1o 
(红包) money” (literally, “red envelope” money, given to children at Chinese New 
Year), and “mahjongg party”.  Such cosmetic changes will amount to little.  Even 
if the story is presented in a completely Chinese context, Dien’s prediction of the 
likely response of a Chinese respondent when faced with such a dilemma still 
rings true:  “Under the Confucian precept regarding filial piety, the son is 
expected to obey parental orders and to make sacrifices for the happiness of his 
parents.  What choice does the child in the story have?” (1982, 337).  Chinese 
(and other non-Western) respondents are similarly left without options in the 
MMPI, which omits “important emic (culture-specific) constructs that are 
indigenous to a particular culture” (Cheung et al., 1996).  There are also 
concerns that Hofstede’s dimensions are culture bound, a concern which 
Hofstede himself indirectly acknowledged: “If we begin to realize that our own 
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ideas are culturally limited. . .  we can never be self-sufficient again.  Only 
others with different mental programs can help us find the limitations of our own” 
(1980, 374).  As for the Big Five, after studies with Chinese participants, 
researchers have failed to identify one of the five and have identified a Chinese 
tradition factor that has no connection to the Big Five (Triandis & Suh,  
2002, 150). 
 As Gries notes, “The idea that cultures can be so different that 
understanding one another is impossible is extremely pernicious.  There is 
much that all humans share. . . .  But. . . [we] do need to be aware of cultural 
differences” (2004, 112), and while some may despair at the futility of 
intercultural research—since “culture-free and culture-fair tests cannot be 
constructed” (van de Vivjer & Leung, 1997, 269) and “cultural bias. . . can 
probably never be eliminated fully from any testing instrument” (Vine, 1986, 
435)—others have fortunately accepted the challenge to do intercultural 
research well, and to construct tests that are as culture-free and culture-fair as 
possible, with limited cultural bias.  Samuel Huntington’s general criticism in The 
clash of civilizations that what non-Westerners see as Western is seen by 
Westerners as universal (1996, 67) certainly applies to some Western 
researchers in particular, but it is not impossible for Western researchers to 
correctly identify Western cultural elements as such, and not treat them as 
universals.  In this study, the validity of the MEFI will be assessed in two areas: 
as a tool of intercultural research (including the issues of establishing the 
universality of human behaviour, distinguishing between etics and emics, 
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translation equivalence, conceptual equivalence, scalar equivalence, possible 
cultural bias in Likert scales, and cultural attitudes regarding both self-disclosure 
and consistency between thoughts/feelings and behaviours) and by considering 
differences between Western and Chinese culture (including the effects of 
Confucian and Christian traditions, the differences between low- and high-
context cultures, and what Ohbuchi, Fukushima, and Tedeschi (1999, 52) 
identify as “the most important cultural dimension in accounting for cultural 
differences”: individualism-collectivism.  The Interpersonal Relatedness factor, 
as defined by the Chinese Personality Assessment Inventory, will also be 
considered).  These are important, essential questions to consider when 
researching and comparing behaviour in different cultures, especially when 
comparing two cultures as distant as the West and China.  In the course of the 
study I will not only be forced to make gross overgeneralizations about the 
individuals who actually comprise both Chinese and Western culture, but will 
also attempt to discuss and define aspects of Chinese culture in English.  I will 
use “Chinese” and “Western” as generic terms that do not suggest that there is 
one fixed way in which either Chinese or Westerners think or act. 
 In this study of the MEFI, my hypothesis is that in Mandarin, the concepts 
of forgiveness and tolerance are much less clearly delineated than they are in 
English.  It is difficult to imagine two Westerners being unable to explain the 
difference between “I forgive you” and “I tolerate you” (see Augsburger, above), 
and it was in this context that the EFI was developed.  When the inventory is 
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applied in a culture that may not make such a clear-cut distinction (see Chao, 
above), the question arises: what is being measured?   
 
1.2  Methodology  
    1.2.1  Participants 
 Intercultural researchers often target university subjects in various 
cultures in an effort “to standardize as much as possible relative social class 
standing within culture, to control education across cultures, and to make more 
accurate developmental comparisons possible” (Park, 1998, 39).  Researchers 
realize that “to make valid comparisons, subjects must be similar in terms of 
relevant background characteristics, otherwise differences may be due to 
sample-specific, rather than cultural differences” (van de Vivjer & Leung, 1997, 
264).  While university students from different cultures all, presumably, attend 
university classes in their home cultures, there may be little else that they share.  
Comparing data, for example, from “undergraduate psychology students” in two 
different cultures may seem to minimize sample-specific differences, but such a 
label may obscure substantial differences between the two groups, depending 
upon both the educational opportunities available and the popularity of different 
courses in the two cultures.  As Bond (1995, 196) points out with respect to 
American and Japanese psychology students, since a relatively higher 
proportion of Americans attend university, and since psychology courses are 
relatively popular, American undergraduate students are more representative 
than their counterparts in Japan, where opportunities to attend university are 
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more limited and where psychology courses are less in demand.  Japanese 
psychology undergraduates are less representative of their cultures.  For this 
study, university students were chosen specifically not in the name of 
intercultural standardization but rather because if the MEFI were to be 
administered in China, university students would almost certainly be recruited as 
participants in an attempt at standardization that may well prove fruitless.  There 
is little to suggest that university students in the USA and China are socially, 
educationally, and developmentally comparable.  In China’s highly stratified 
education system, in fact, it is recognized that even students in the same city 
who attend different colleges or universities do indeed, by virtue of their 
enrolment in these different institutions, vary widely in terms of social, 
educational, and developmental levels (personal communication in 
conversation, Chen Hongyan, July, 2004).  That Chinese educational institutions 
are more stratified than Western ones is evidenced by the greater number of 
Mandarin terms for post-secondary institutions and the resulting difficulty in 
translating some institutions’ names into English, since English does not 
distinguish between so many levels of post-secondary institutions.   
 University students attending West China Normal University (in 
Nanchong, a medium-sized city in Sichuan province) were asked to respond to 
my questionnaire.  In order to avoid the potential problems involved in 
attempting to translate “forgiveness” into Mandarin myself on the questionnaire, 
the questionnaire is designed to be used with respondents having a high 
enough level of English to understand Enright’s English definition of forgiveness 
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so that they can themselves provide the appropriate Mandarin term.  All of the 
respondents were English majors in the university’s School of Foreign 
Languages, and all were in the senior (fourth) year of their studies.  All had 
successfully completed a one-month English-teaching practicum, all had 
submitted major term papers written in English, and all had passed the Test for 
English Majors—Band 4, the standardized national test required for 
convocation.  An analysis of passages from the reading comprehension 
sections of six previous TEM-4 examinations (used from 1997-2002) yielded the 
following Flesch-Kincaid grade levels (based on the U.S. high school grade level 
system): 13.5, 13.4, 13.1, 13.9, 12.0, and 15.4 (Tests for English Majors (TEM-
4), 2003: 13, 40, 60, 83, 109, 129).   
 These students, admittedly, have had a greater exposure to the West 
than the average Chinese university student, through language courses, 
courses on Western culture in general, courses in British and American 
literature in particular, and through prolonged exposure to Western teachers, 
both inside and outside of the classroom, over their four-year university career.  
While even non-English major Chinese university students are required to attain 
a level of English proficiency (determined by the College English Test—Band 4), 
their contact with Western culture would be very limited compared to the 
theoretical and personal knowledge of the West possessed by the respondents 
to my questionnaire.  If anything, these student participants would be expected 
to have a more developed understanding of the English word “forgiveness” than 
the average Chinese university student.  If it can be shown that these somewhat 
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“Westernized” respondents do not share a Western view of forgiveness, it can 
be assumed that the understanding of more truly representative respondents 
will be even further removed. 
 
    1.2.2  The questionnaire 
 The questionnaire (see Appendix 1 for the original and Appendix 2 for 
English translations of the Mandarin sections of the questionnaire) is made up of 
nine questions.  Questions 1 to 6 are objective questions.  The first two 
questions ask for one Mandarin word corresponding to the English definition of 
forgiveness and one Mandarin word corresponding to the English definition of 
tolerance.  In question three, these two Mandarin terms are then matched 
(according to closeness of meaning) to sixteen different Mandarin terms that 
have been offered as Mandarin equivalents to “forgiveness” or “tolerance”.  The 
two terms are then matched (according to relevance) to twenty-six Mandarin 
sayings that seem to be related to forgiveness and tolerance (in question five) 
and then, in question six, to twenty-two items selected from the Mandarin 
Enright Forgiveness Inventory (MEFI).  The remaining questions deal 
specifically with Enright’s definition of forgiveness.  Given an English version of 
this questionnaire, data from Westerners would yield highly consistent results, 
since the concepts of forgiveness and tolerance are easily distinguished.  (As 
will be shown, researchers often take great pains in delineating what 
forgiveness is not.  While these lists are often long (Rempel, 2003, provides 
nine items; Enright & Fitzgibbons, 2000, list 20) , “tolerance” does not appear, 
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suggesting that while other concepts may mistakenly be identified as 
forgiveness, tolerance is not included among these concepts—at least not in 
English.)  If the results of this questionnaire show a wide range of answers, then 
the concepts of forgiveness and tolerance are not as easily distinguishable in 
Mandarin as they are in English, and the MEFI is actually an inventory of both 
forgiveness and tolerance, and, essentially, a letter from Ying. 
 18
 
 
 
Chapter Two 
 
FORGIVENESS IN THE WEST 
 
 Three publicly recognized examples of forgiveness have recently 
attracted Canadian media attention.  After a brief description of these events, 
the concept of forgiveness in the West will be discussed in general terms, and 
then relevant aspects of that discussion will be applied to the three examples. 
 On September 6, 2001, two young men broke into Grace Mennonite 
Church in Prince Albert, Saskatchewan.  Once inside, they “went through 
various rooms, trashing almost everything in sight.  Property inside the church 
was scattered and smashed, seven pews and the grand piano were overturned, 
the pulpit and alter [sic] were overturned and smashed, and the overhead 
projector smashed” (Polischuk, 2002).  In all, the pair caused an estimated 
$40,000 in damages.  The elder of the two, who had several previous 
convictions, was sentenced to five months on charges of mischief and break 
and enter, along with several unrelated charges.  Ed Olfert, the church’s pastor, 
visited him throughout his incarceration, and met with him within two hours of 
his release.  Prior to his release, the young man had written a letter to the 
congregation expressing his remorse, his desire to make amends, and an offer 
to deliver his apologies in person.  He met with members of the congregation “to 
discuss the emotions felt by the congregation, to begin healing for both parties, 
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and to find some sort of restitution” (Vis, 2002).  While connections were made 
between the young man and members of the congregation, as Olfert observed, 
“relationship took more work than some of us expected.  And eventually, his 
issues overtook him again, and back into jail he went” (personal communication 
via e-mail, April 8, 2004).  This limited, but did not end, further contact between 
the young man and members of the church. 
 On April 28, 1999, a 14-year-old boy armed with a .22-caliber rifle 
entered W. R. Myers High School in Taber, Alberta, and seriously wounded one 
17-year-old student and killed 17-year-old Jason Lang.  Lang’s father, Rev. Dale 
Lang, an Anglican priest, forgave his son’s killer three days after the shooting.  
In the weeks and months that followed, Rev. Lang travelled around the country, 
describing to more than 200 high school audiences the details of the shooting 
itself, the shock he experienced upon losing his son, and how he was able to 
forgive the boy who shot Jason.  Lang and his family continue to offer support to 
the boy and his family. 
 On September 29, 2003, the NHL 2002 rookie of the year, Dany Heatley, 
lost control of his speeding Ferrari and slammed into a concrete wall.  Heatley 
was injured and his passenger, his Atlanta Thrashers team-mate, Dan Snyder, 
was killed.  Following Snyder’s funeral at Elmira Mennonite Church, the church 
the Snyder family attends, Snyder’s father delivered a prepared statement to a 
room filled with reporters, which included the following statements: 
We are all human beings and we know that humans make mistakes. . . .  
We want you to know we do not lay blame on Dany Heatley for the 
accident that took our son from us. . . .  Forgiveness is also a part of 
being human and we know there is nothing to gain from harbouring 
 20
resentment or anger towards others.  We are here to support him through 
this difficult time.  (CBC Sports Online, 2003)  
 
While forgiveness may be “part of being human”, it is not common, as is noted 
by one commentator: “The manner in which [Dan’s brother] Jake and his family 
have come to Heatley’s aid is something you’d expect in one of those 
everything-will-turn-out-all-right-in-the-end Disney movies, but almost never see 
in real life” (Zeisberger, 2004). The family later testified that “they didn’t want 
Heatley to go to jail or lose his hockey career” (Weber, 2005).  In sentencing 
Heatley, Judge Rowland Barnes honoured that request and sentenced Heatley 
to three years of probation, with the requirement that during that time Heatley 
give 150 speeches about the dangers of speeding.  While noting the Snyders’ 
support of Heatley, Judge Barnes commented, “I don’t know that I could do this 
if I were you” (Weber, 2005). 
 These three incidents are examples not only of forgiveness in the West  
but, more specifically, Christian forgiveness.  Forgiveness has long been within 
the domain of the church.  Hannah Arendt accounts for this (“the discoverer of 
the role of forgiveness in the realm of human affairs was Jesus of Nazareth”—
1998, 238), but she does not believe that forgiveness should be confined within 
the church: “The fact that he made this discovery in a religious context and 
articulated it in religious language is no reason to take it any less seriously in a 
strictly secular sense” (1998, 238).  Unfortunately, Arendt’s 1958 admonition 
went unheeded for decades.  Martin had complained that “forgiveness as a 
transaction between men has been almost entirely neglected by philosophers” 
(1953, 313)—psychologists were equally uninterested.  Hope (1987) discovered 
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that neither “forgiveness” nor its synonyms could be found in the Psychological 
Abstracts, the Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry, or the Handbook of 
Family Therapy.  Rowe et al. (1989) suggest that, in their roles as natural 
scientists, psychologists were more eager to focus their attention on areas more 
amenable to the experimental method.  The complaints of Martin and Hope are 
now groundless, since philosophers and psychologists no longer neglect 
forgiveness.  In the 1990s, more than 200 books about forgiveness were 
published (Wuthnow, 2000, 125), and Bishop Tutu observes that “the study of 
forgiveness has become a growth industry” (1999, 271).  Detractors consider 
“slowing down the runaway forgiveness truck” (McKnight, 2004) and write 
disparagingly of “trendy forgiveness boosterism” (Lamb & Murphy, 2002, x), 
which would include treating forgiveness “as a form of therapy. Guilt is the 
disease. Absolution the cure” (Marino, 1995, 9).  
 Although forgiveness has attracted more attention within the last few 
decades, philosophers and psychologists have not been successful in agreeing 
on a stable definition of forgiveness—in fact, “some interpret the lack of 
consensus in definition to be one of the most pernicious problems in the field 
today” (McCullough et al., 2000, 7)—a field “bedeviled by clumsy definitions, 
confusing categories, and contextual dislocations” (McKnight, 2004, 36). 
Fincham points out that the danger in forgiveness research lies in the very 
familiarity of the construct.  This familiarity breeds not contempt, but rather a 
proliferation of lay experts communicating about forgiveness when they have 
not ascertained (or even realized such clarification is necessary) whether they 
 22
have the same referents for the term.  As Fincham points out, these 
“unarticulated assumptions that we share about forgiveness may obscure 
understanding and hinder research” (2000, 6). 
It is easier to identify what forgiveness is not than it is to specify exactly 
what it is, and in this effort, I will call upon the assistance of Pat (the perpetrator) 
and Val (the victim), for convenience’ sake. 
 Forgiveness is not condoning (that would involve Val overlooking Pat’s 
wrongdoing), nor excusing (in which Val would recognize that a wrong was done 
by Pat, but accept that Pat was not fully responsible).  Val is unable to pardon 
Pat unless Val holds the relevant official position and has the legal authority to 
absolve Pat of his offence.  Pat can deny Val’s wrongdoing, or even forget about 
it, but neither of these qualify as forgiveness.  Denial is a refusal to acknowledge 
the facts, and forgetting is not, strictly speaking, an action—in fact, the more Val 
tries to forget the offence, the more difficult the forgetting becomes.  Forgiving is 
not the same as understanding, in spite of the aphorism, “Tout compris, c’est 
tout pardonné”—in fact, as J. L. Austin points out, “That’s quite wrong; 
understanding might just add contempt to hatred” (1975, 37).  Were Val to justify 
Pat’s wrongdoing, that would involve accepting that Pat did it, but Val would 
have to deny that any wrong was involved.  Finally, forgiveness is not 
reconciliation—that refers to the restoration of the pre-offense relationship—
“reconciliation entails forgiveness, but forgiveness does not necessarily entail 
reconciliation” (Fincham, 2000, 7).  While reconciliation often follows 
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forgiveness, reconciliation, as Kolnai writes, “emphasizes the result, not the 
essence, of forgiveness” (1973-74, 94). 
Forgiveness is impossible in the absence of an offense—not just a 
mistake that needs to be corrected (but not forgiven), but a moral transgression 
that Pat commits which disrupts Pat and Val’s relationship.  Martin (1953, 319) 
is critical of those who assume that “the former relationship between the 
persons can be re-established by the simple god-like fiat of the offended”—i.e., 
Val’s mouthing of the words, “I forgive you, Pat.”  Val has to do more than that.  
What Val has to do initially is to get angry and resentful, since Pat’s action has 
led Val to three conclusions: 
      (1)  The act in question was wrong; it was a serious offence,  worthy 
 of moral attention.        
 (2)  The wrongdoer [i.e., Pat] is a legitimate member of the moral 
 community who can be expected not to do such things.  As such, [Pat] is 
 someone to be held responsible and [Pat] is worth being upset by.  
 (3)  [Val], as the one wronged, ought not to be wronged.  This sort  of 
 treatment stands as an offense to [Val’s] person.  (Hieronymi, 2001, 530)
   
To count as genuine forgiveness, Val must abandon resentment without 
compromising these three conclusions.  Val can downplay the seriousness of 
the wrong, or the worth of Pat (by saying something like, “you can’t really expect 
any better from Pat”), but that would be either condoning Pat’s action or 
diminishing Pat’s moral standing.  Benbaji and Heyd recognize the paradoxical 
nature of forgiveness: “it does not reduce the commitment to those values on 
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the basis of which the initial negative response was made.”  That is “the whole 
point” (2001, 573). 
 There are a multitude of variables that may affect Val’s response, if any, 
to Pat.  Val may love Pat dearly, but it is possible for love and anger to coexist—
in fact, the more Val cares for Pat, the more important Pat is to Val, the more 
angry Val will likely be.  As William Blake notes, “it is easier to forgive an Enemy 
than to forgive a Friend” (1973, 15).  As Hieronymi points out, “while anger and 
love are compatible, anger and forgiveness are not compatible” (2001, 539).  
Ideally, Val will not be content with the new status quo, since   
The process of forgiveness must be initiated by the offended. . . .  Once 
mutual confidence and trust have been destroyed, they can be re-
established, if at all, only by the person who is not guilty of destroying 
them in the first place. . . .  Forgiveness begins with the refusal of the 
offended to accept the conditions of the relationship as final.  (Martin, 
1953, 320)     
 
 Of course Pat can help Val by repenting.  While the forgiveness of an 
unrepentant offender is certainly a supererogatory act (cf. Benbaji & Heyd, 
2001, 577; Downie, 1965; Fincham, 2000, 7), some feel a moral duty to forgive 
an offender who has apologized.  Indeed, Wilson claims that “genuine 
forgiveness does require repentance on the part of the wrongdoer, and must be 
(so to speak) a bilateral and not just a unilateral operation” (1988, 534).  Even if 
repentance is required to achieve true forgiveness, it is still not “in the quid pro 
quo sense that the offended will forgive the offender if he repents (Martin, 1953, 
327).  Hieronymi wonders what it is about an apology that suddenly transforms 
the offended person.  She suggests that accepting a misplaced apology in order 
to help the offender feel better is a display of compassion, and perhaps mercy, 
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but not forgiveness (2001, 544).  She explains that, “With forgiveness, the 
offended agrees to bear in her own person the cost of the wrongdoing and to 
incorporate the injury into her own life without further protest and without 
demand for retribution” (551).  Hope (1987) also recognizes that “real 
forgiveness always, always involves a little death that is definitely not pleasant 
and easy to endure” (242).  Hieronymi concludes her discussion with this 
admission, which is perhaps what Pat would say to Val: “I don’t want your pity.  
Not even your compassion will suffice.  I need something at once more intimate 
and more costly—I need your forgiveness” (554). 
 Suppose Val forgives Pat.  What is the result?  Once their relationship 
has been re-established,  
. . . forgiveness has performed its function. . . .  The moral law has not 
been circumvented, denied, or neglected.  Its authority has been 
sustained and re-established.  The moral law has not been denied, but 
affirmed.  Nor has the offence been overlooked or forgotten.  It has been 
dealt with in such a way that its destructive effect upon the relationship 
between the two persons has been destroyed.  (Martin, 1953, 332)   
  
  
 McCullough et al. (2000, 9), offer a concise definition of forgiveness: 
“intra-individual, prosocial change toward a perceived transgressor that is 
situated within a specific interpersonal context.”  The inclusion of “perceived” is 
problematic since, as shown above, an actual transgression must occur; a 
perception that a transgression has occurred is not enough.  The “prosocial” 
aspect is necessary, since, “a definition that exclusively emphasizes forgiveness 
as the reduction of negative emotions may lead clients away from resentment or 
hatred, but into a cold neutrality that is not forgiveness” (Human Development 
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Study Group, 1991, 56).  North offers a more readable definition: “If we are to 
forgive, our resentment is to be overcome not by denying ourselves the right to 
that resentment, but by endeavouring to view the wrongdoer with compassion, 
benevolence, and love while recognizing that he has wilfully abandoned his right 
to them” (1987, 502).  Like Hieronymi, North insists that “cheap” forgiveness 
(e.g., condoning, excusing, etc.) is not genuine forgiveness.  This insistence 
may surprise many who are happy to defuse difficult situations in just these 
ways.  While “cheap” forgiveness may be instantaneous, genuine forgiveness 
takes time. 
 Forgiveness is widely seen as a process.  In Absolute friends, John le 
Carré describes the letter Teddy Mundy writes to the former mentor/co-
conspirator (and “absolute friend”) who “stole his girl”:  “He determinedly 
forgives him Judith.  He forgives Judith too.  He has been forgiving her for 
longer than he cares to think, and failing every time” (2003, 129).  Mundy’s 
experience echoes the accomplishment C. S. Lewis wrote of shortly before his 
death:  “I think I have at last forgiven the cruel schoolmaster who so darkened 
my youth. I had done it many times before, but this time I think I have really 
done it” (cited in Smedes, 2001).  Smedes’ comment on Lewis’ long struggle 
with forgiveness applies to both Mundy and Lewis: “Maybe, had he lived longer, 
he would have had to do it again” (Smedes, 2001).  Enright (along with others—
cf., Andrews, 2000; Benbaji & Heyd, 2001; Fincham, 2000; Govier, 2002; 
Martin, 1953; Wuthnow, 2000) recognizes forgiveness as a process, while 
acknowledging that “the processes people go through in the name of 
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forgiveness may vary widely” (Enright & the Human Development Study Group, 
1991, 146).  When he was interviewed about the anger that people were feeling 
shortly after the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, 
Enright indirectly suggested that in spite of this variation, the process of 
forgiveness may begin in the same way: “Rage is good. . . .  Forgiveness starts 
with rage” (cited in Duin, 2001). 
 The procedural nature of forgiveness is important to consider in 
determining whether or not “I forgive you” is an Austinian performative 
utterance.  While Augsburger classifies forgiveness as a performative utterance 
in the sense that “the actual occasion of forgiveness is performed by a 
recognized verbal formula” (1996, 12), the procedural nature of forgiveness 
would make “I forgive you” a “happy” utterance (to use Austin’s term) only if it 
were uttered at the end of the process, and even then it would not be a 
performative utterance but a constative, reporting on an existing condition, and 
would be properly expressed as “I have forgiven you”.  
 Haber (1991, 29) classifies “forgive” as an Austinian behabitive (“a kind of 
performative concerned roughly with reactions to behaviour and with behaviour 
towards others and designed to exhibit attitudes and feelings”—Austin, 1975, 
83).  Austin’s examples of behabitives include the following:  apologize, thank, 
deplore, compliment, congratulate, sympathize, resent, criticize, applaud, 
overlook, commend, welcome, bless, curse, and toast (1975, 160).  These 
share, along with another Austin example of a performative (“I promise”—1975, 
9), the potential of becoming “infelicities” (Austin’s term for a situation where 
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“something goes wrong and the act . . . is therefore at least to some extent a 
failure: the utterance is then, we may say, not indeed false but in general 
unhappy”—1975, 14.)  A promise may be broken, and an apology, a 
compliment, a criticism, a blessing, or a curse may all be “taken back”, but in 
each case, at the point of utterance, the action was performed, even if the 
speaker subsequently has a change of heart.  If challenged by the recipient of 
the promise, apology, compliment, or criticism, the speaker would likely 
respond, “Yes, I did X, but I have changed my mind.”  In many cases, this 
turnaround would be the result of some incident or some discovery that sheds 
new light upon the circumstances that initially prompted the original utterance.  
In this sense, forgiveness is qualitatively different, since in the case of lapsed 
forgiveness, the speaker would be more likely to explain the lapse not in terms 
of some external influence or change in circumstances but would be more likely 
to say, “When I said I forgave you, I thought I had, but—choose one—I really 
hadn’t/ I was wrong/ I can’t.”  Forgiveness, in other words, had never taken 
place.   
 As Lang points out, when the words, “I forgive you” are spoken, “there 
surely is something of the character of a promise in that phrase” (1994, 109).  
Certainly “the harm-doer is likely to experience the statement as performative 
and be puzzled, annoyed, or angry when incompletely resolved feelings of 
resentment about the harm-doing intrude upon subsequent discourse or 
behaviour in the relationship” (Fincham, 2000, 17).  While “I forgive you” takes 
the form of a performative utterance, the intention of the speaker could perhaps 
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be better expressed as, “I will try to forgive you” or “I promise to forgive you”.  In 
that case, the lapsed forgiver would answer to accusations of breaking a 
promise (“But you promised to forgive me!”) rather than lying (“But you said you 
forgave me!”).  “To promise” is a well-established performative, and it is perhaps 
the “promise”-like character of forgiveness that leads some to consider “to 
forgive” a performative as well.  
 Horsbrugh offers another test of whether or not an utterance is 
performative: “one cannot use the verb ‘to try’ in connection with any 
performative expression” (1974, 270).  According to this test, “I forgive” is 
certainly not performative.  (Horsbrugh, in fact, refuses to accept that this 
phrase can ever be used performatively, since “the uttering of these words 
never of itself constitutes forgiveness”—1974, 270.)  He would agree that 
forgiveness occurs in the case of a sudden and dramatic reversal of feeling that 
ends a quarrel, but maintains that “this would remain true even if the words 
remained unuttered” (1974, 270n.; cf. Rempel, 2003).   
 Haber contends that “I forgive you” (“as an expression of how one 
feels”—1991, 31) is a behabitive performative utterance, and he ends a 
discussion of a situation in which Val has forgiven Pat yet still harbours 
resentment toward Pat with this perplexing conclusion: “the fact that [Val] 
continues to harbour resentment does not undermine [Val’s] having forgiven 
[Pat] at all” (1991, 31).  His response to Horsbrugh’s test is that “it makes 
perfect sense to use ‘to try’ with such performatives as ‘I welcome,’ ‘I 
congratulate,’ ‘I do’ (take this woman, etc.), and so forth” (1991, 56).  Horsbrugh 
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is admittedly vague in his claim that “to try” cannot be “connected” to a 
performative.  Words can be connected in a number of ways, and Haber 
apparently associates this “trying” element with the actual utterance of the 
performative, even though a statement such as, “He was trying to say, ‘I do’” 
suggests a groom with a stutter or some other kind of speech impediment rather 
than a groom having second thoughts.  While he is vague in the description of 
his test, Horsbrugh shows very clearly in his examples how “to try” should be 
connected with any possible performative: “The phrase, ‘I’ll try to forgive you’ . . . 
is not a performative” (1974, 270).  The “trying” is connected to the verb itself, 
not to the physical act of producing the sounds.   
 That forgiveness is distinct from welcoming, congratulating, or saying “I 
do” is obvious when one compares the reaction of someone who hears the 
words, “I’ll try to forgive you”, with the reactions of people who are told, “I’ll try to 
welcome you,” “I’ll try to congratulate you”, or, “I’ll try to say, ‘I do’.”  The former 
phrase would likely evoke feelings of relief, thankfulness, hope, and 
appreciation, while the latter expressions (if they were ever uttered in the first 
place, which seems unlikely) would arouse feelings of anger, indignation, and 
offence.   
 Haber also attempts to downplay Downie’s distinction between “I 
promise” and “I forgive” (i.e., uttering the words, “I promise” constitutes a 
promise even if the appropriate behaviour is not forthcoming, while uttering the 
words, “I forgive you” does not constitute forgiveness unless the appropriate 
behaviour is forthcoming—1965, 131).  Haber accuses Downie of “being blind to 
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‘I forgive you’ as a behabitive” (1991, 54) and reasserts his position that 
forgiveness and resentment are compatible: 
As I see it, if a speaker has felicitously expressed forgiveness, then 
should he not have overcome his resentment—that is, changed his 
attitude—he has nonetheless forgiven, provided he is willing to try to do 
so in the future.  (1991, 55) 
 
As shown above, “forgive” is distinct from Austin’s behabitives, and Haber’s 
insistence on a resenting forgiveness is hard to accept.  When considering their 
own feelings, most people would feel that they have not forgiven those against 
whom they still harbour feelings of resentment, agreeing with Rempel that 
“simply offering the words ‘I forgive you’ when underlying anger and resentment 
still exist is not true forgiveness” (2003, 10).  A person who had offended Haber 
and been subsequently forgiven by him would understandably question Haber’s 
sincerity if Haber continued to express resentment over the “forgiven” incident.   
 The words, “I forgive you”, do not in themselves constitute forgiveness, 
while forgiveness may occur with no words spoken, which shows that the 
phrase is not an explicit performative utterance according to one of Austin’s own 
tests of whether or not a person has uttered a performative: “Could he be doing 
the action without uttering the performative?” (1975, 84).  The words “I forgive 
you” can be tremendously significant, life-changing words, but they do not 
constitute a performative utterance—“the recitation of such words need not be 
required for a victim to forgive” (Rempel, 2003, 10). 
 With regard to the three case studies cited earlier, the words “I forgive 
you” were uttered—in two cases they were uttered in de facto press 
conferences.  In each case there was undoubtedly cause for responses of, in 
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Enright’s terms, “resentment, negative judgement, and indifferent behaviour” 
and also in each case those involved were seen to display “compassion, 
generosity and even love” to those who had, in one way or another, offended 
them (Enright et al., 2000, 1). 
 Those who forgive are not always applauded for their actions.  Jeffrie 
Murphy (1988, 2000, and 2002) stands out as a critic/cynic among scholars who 
write on forgiveness—although some would charge that what Murphy often 
criticizes is actually pseudo-forgiveness—but laypersons have voiced 
reservations as well. After delivering a sermon in which he mentioned his son’s 
murder and how he had forgiven the shooter, Dale Lang was approached by a 
woman who “said she couldn’t understand how he could forgive the boy, 
because she’d lost her daughter 15 years earlier to a drunk driver, and she’d 
been angry ever since (Minister preaches forgiveness, 2000).  Similarly, 
President of the Irish Republic, Mary McAleese, describes the response to the 
forgiveness shown by a father whose daughter died in the Enniskillen bombing: 
His words shamed us, caught us off guard.  They sounded so different 
from what we expected and what we are used to. . . .  But he had his 
detractors and unbelievably his bags of hate mail.  How dare you forgive? 
they shouted.  What kind of father are you who can forgive your 
daughter’s killers? . . . .  As one church-going critic said to me. . . “Sure 
the poor man must have been in shock,” as if to offer love and 
forgiveness is a sign of mental weakness instead of spiritual strength. 
(1999) 
 
Her comments are echoed by Sister Helen Prejean, death row counselor and 
author of Dead man walking:  
In our society, forgiveness is often seen as weakness.  People who 
forgive those who have hurt them or their family are made to look as if 
they really don’t care about their loved ones.  But forgiveness is 
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tremendous strength.  It is the action of someone who refuses to be 
consumed by hatred and revenge. (1994) 
 
The forgiveness shown by the members of the ransacked church in Prince 
Albert inspired an editorial in the local newspaper which concluded: “The church 
members are setting an example more of us should follow—the ability to forgive, 
if not forget, and a willingness to help those who have hurt us understand why it 
should not happen again” (Gustafson & Dahl, 2002).  The editors commend the 
church members not only for their forgiveness, but also for their willingness to 
show the young man “the error of his ways”, which, despite the implication, is 
not included in the definition of forgiveness. 
 Of course, no definition can be exhaustive.  The definition upon which 
Enright bases the EFI lends itself rather easily to a tripartite instrument that 
examines affective, behavioural, and cognitive responses: “Forgiveness is a 
willingness to abandon one’s right to resentment, negative judgement, and 
indifferent behaviour toward one who unjustly injured us, while fostering the 
undeserved qualities of compassion, generosity and even love toward him or 
her” (Enright, Rique, & Coyle, 2000, 1).  The negative qualities listed here more 
closely correspond to their respective domains than do the positive qualities.  
Negative feelings, thoughts, and behaviours are labelled “resentment, negative 
judgement, and indifferent behaviour”.  (The use of “indifferent” here is 
surprising—if Pat has the right to resentment and negative judgment after Val’s 
injury, surely Pat is entitled to behave toward Val with animosity and enmity, not 
merely cold indifference.  While indifference has been identified as “the worst 
sin toward our fellow creatures” and “the essence of inhumanity” by George 
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Bernard Shaw (cited in Augsburger, 1970), and as “humanity’s greatest 
challenge” by Elie Wiesel (cited in Fry, 1997, 241), in the interests of 
consistency the definition should use “indifferent” to modify each of the domains 
to emphasize that true forgiveness involves positive thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviour and not just indifferent ones, as some seem to imagine.) 
 Among the positive qualities, “generosity” would exhibit itself through 
action (behaviour), but it is difficult to distinguish between “compassion” and 
“love” and identify which is in the affective and which is in the cognitive domain, 
or if, perhaps, “compassion. . . and even love” both refer to the affective domain, 
leaving the cognitive domain unrepresented.  Indifferent behaviour and 
generosity are the two poles on the behaviour subscale, while resentment is the 
negative pole on the affective subscale and negative judgement is the negative 
pole on the cognitive subscale.  The positive poles on the latter two subscales 
may be compassion and love, but it is difficult to be more specific.  While the 
definition lends itself to a three-part division of forgiveness, the distinctions are 
not clear-cut. 
 The definition, of necessity, leaves some specifics of forgiveness 
unaddressed.  Of the ten debateable issues raised in Chapter One, this 
definition addresses none.  It does, however, provide a concise description of 
quantifiable criteria that may be quite objectively assessed by respondents and 
measured by researchers, although ambiguities are present.  The definition also 
features a troubling discrepancy (or at least a lost opportunity for parallelism) in 
describing forgiveness as “a willingness to abandon” some attributes and 
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“fostering” others.  Replacing the former with “abandoning” or the latter with “a 
willingness to foster” would not only accord the two halves of the definition 
similar status but also address an issue raised by McCullough and Worthington: 
Forgiveness should be distinguished from its consequences.  
Forgiveness is related to changes in affect, cognition, and behaviour 
regarding an offender, but it is unclear which among these changes 
forgiveness comprises per se and which ones are the consequences of 
forgiveness.  Distinctions between content and consequences of 
forgiveness should follow logically from a definition of forgiveness.  
(1994, 12) 
 
If forgiveness is defined as “a willingness” to abandon and foster certain 
attributes, the changes in affect, behaviour, and cognition are the consequences 
of forgiveness, i.e., it is after forgiving that one exhibits these changes; if, 
however, forgiveness is defined as “abandoning” and “fostering” the appropriate 
attributes, the changes themselves constitute forgiveness.  It is highly unlikely 
that Enright did not intend to accord equal status to the definition’s positive and 
negative components, but as it stands, his inconsistent definition does not meet 
McCullough and Worthington’s standard.   
 It is not surprising that a construct as rich as forgiveness resists 
definition.  Smedes reminds us that “reality is always more prickly and awkward 
than our definitions of it” (1998, 350), but in spite of this, an erroneous analysis 
is preferable to one that is not clear, since “science is advanced more by error 
than by confusion” (Fincham, 2000, 10).  In the final analysis, however, it is one 
thing for researchers to agree upon a standard definition of forgiveness, but it is 
quite another to ensure that those being questioned have the same idea, since 
as Huang and Enright have observed, “not all who say they forgive understand 
 36
what that means in the same way” (2000, 77).  Doing such research 
interculturally undoubtedly compounds the problem, since “the translation of the 
name of a concept from one language to another does not mean that the 
speakers understand the concept in the same way” (Davis, 2001, 88).  That the 
research involves such a multi-faceted construct further increases the potential 
for misunderstanding since, as Kipnis describes it, “Translation requires 
unpacking one’s own assumptions as much as describing foreign ones” (1995, 
105).  Ransley and Spy’s admonition to therapists regarding their clients (where 
both share a common language) is equally, if not more, applicable to Western 
researchers and their non-English speaking respondents: “Language has power 
and in a world where bias is hard to avoid, it is clearly important that therapists 
[and researchers] check the precise meaning clients [or respondents] give to 
such words.  It is their words, their meanings that matter” (2004, 5). 
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Chapter Three 
 
FORGIVENESS AND THE ENRIGHT FORGIVENESS INVENTORY  
 
(IN ENGLISH AND MANDARIN) 
 
 
3.1 Forgiveness and the Enright Forgiveness Inventory  
 Forgiveness is a complex construct, and the difficulties involved in 
working with such a contested concept are acknowledged in the EFI User’s 
Manual:  “considering that the word ‘forgiveness’ may generate conceptual 
biases, the authors took the precaution of not using the word ‘forgiveness’ in the 
EFI or during verbal instruction prior to administration” (Enright, Rique, & Coyle, 
2000, 5).  The EFI is designed to measure forgiveness as defined by Enright et 
al.:  “Forgiveness is a willingness to abandon one’s right to resentment, negative 
judgement, and indifferent behaviour toward one who unjustly injured us, while 
fostering the undeserved qualities of compassion, generosity and even love 
toward him or her” (2000, 1).  This definition serves to distinguish forgiveness 
from the many other actions that are sometimes mistakenly identified as 
forgiveness, and also makes it very clear that forgiveness involves not only 
abandoning the path that may lead to revenge but also fostering qualities which 
may lead to reconciliation.  According to this definition, the three case studies 
presented in Chapter Two are all examples of forgiveness, and the members of 
Grace Mennonite Church, Rev. Dale Lang, and the members of the Snyder 
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family would be expected to score relatively, perhaps even exceptionally, high 
on the EFI, at least if the described incidents were chosen as their specific 
examples of injury. 
 The EFI items are divided as follows: items 1 to 20 measure one’s 
present feelings; items 21 to 40 measure one’s present behaviours; and items 
41 to 60 measure one’s present thoughts regarding the person responsible for 
“the most recent experience of someone hurting [one] unfairly and deeply” 
(Enright et al., 2000, 5).  The EFI User’s Manual states that for the purposes of 
the inventory, “the key ideas concerning forgiveness. . . are: the reduction in 
negative feelings, thoughts, and behaviour and the development of positive 
feelings, thoughts, and behaviour toward an offending person” (Enright et al., 
2000, 1). 
 Even with this narrowly defined focus, forgiveness is a complex 
construct, and each specific incident of Val forgiving Pat involves a wide array of 
variables: What did Pat do?  Why did Pat do it?  What is the relationship 
between Pat and Val?  Were the effects of the injury short-lived or permanent?  
Was compensation forthcoming (or possible)?  Is Pat still benefiting from the 
spoils of the injury in some way?  Did Pat offer a sincere apology?  How long 
ago did it happen?  Was it a public injury or a private one?  Do Pat and Val still 
have a relationship?  Did Val in any way contribute to the injury?  Was the injury 
the first of its kind or one in a long series of injuries inflicted upon Val?  Did Pat 
receive any form of censure or punishment?  This “baker’s dozen” of variables is 
not exhaustive, but the answers to these and other questions may have a 
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significant impact upon Val’s response to Pat and whether or not (or how soon) 
Val might forgive Pat.  (While the EFI does ask for brief descriptions of the 
“degree of hurt”, the “agent of hurt”, the “status of the agent of hurt” (not 
apologetic/not apologetic or remorseful/not remorseful, but alive/dead), the “time 
since the injury”, and a “description of the offence,” the responses to these 
questions are not used in the calculation of the final score and the user’s 
manual makes no mention of how (or if) this information is to be used.)  If Val 
were to respond to the EFI (at some point after Pat’s injury—options on the EFI 
“time since injury” question range from days to years), the resulting score would 
indicate not only how forgiving Val is, but would also reveal how forgiving Val is 
compared to other victims of injury who have themselves suffered a greater or 
lesser injury and who are similarly influenced by the multitude of variables 
affecting Val.  At least that is the claim: “The higher the [EFI] score, the more 
forgiving is the respondent” (Park & Enright, 2000, 360). 
 Difficult to define, forgiveness may also be difficult to measure objectively 
using sixty questions on an inventory.  Some of the items, most clearly some of 
the behaviour items, may measure more or less than forgiveness.  Depending 
upon the circumstances, some people, believing that they should help anyone in 
trouble, would surely agree to some extent to “aid him/her when in trouble (38)” 
whether the person in distress happens to be a friend, a stranger, or even one 
who had committed some as-of-yet unforgiven injury.  Similarly, one who agrees 
to “attend his/her party (40)” may conceivably be prompted more by the promise 
of good food and scintillating conversation than by any feelings of forgiveness.  
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In both cases, the responses may have little to do with the presence or absence 
of forgiveness. 
 Other items may be more indicative of forgiveness, but in some cases it 
seems that several different items are actually measuring the same indicator of 
forgiveness.  They are synonymous to the point that strongly agreeing with one 
entails strongly agreeing with the other(s).  In these cases, some indicators are 
weighted more heavily than others and affect the total score more than other 
indicators that are measured by a single item.  The following sets of items, listed 
here according to subscale, are virtually synonymous and skew the total score 
by representing a single indicator up to four times: 
 Affect subscale:  (I feel _________ toward him/her.) 
warm (1)/kindness (3)     
affection (18)/friendly (19)     
tender (7)/caring (15) 
repulsed (9)/disgust (14)  
 Behaviour subscale:  (Regarding the person, I do or would _________ .) 
put him/her down (26)/speak ill of him/her (29)    
ignore (23)/not speak to him/her (33) 
avoid (22)/stay away (36) 
reach out to him/her (30)/lend him/her a hand (32)/do a favour 
(37)/ aid him/her when in trouble (38) 
 Cognitive subscale:  (I think he or she is _________ ./I ________.) 
of good quality (44)/worthy of respect (45) 
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horrible (43)/dreadful (46)     
a bad person (53)/evil (42)/immoral (49)/corrupt (52)  
wish him/her well (54)/hope he/she does well in life (57)/ hope 
 he/she succeeds (59)/hope he/she finds happiness (60) 
 
In all of these cases, it is hard to imagine a person not indicating the same 
response for each of the synonymous items, so those indicators will contribute 
far more (or less) to a respondent’s total EFI score than those indicators that are 
mentioned only once. 
 The EFI total score ranges from 60 to 360.  In order to receive the lowest 
score, one must “strongly agree” with all of the negative items and “strongly 
disagree” with all of the positive ones.  To receive the highest score, one must 
“strongly disagree” with all of the negative items and “strongly agree” with all of 
the positive ones.  If, within the positive and negative items within each sub-
scale, there are any items that are mutually exclusive, these minimum and 
maximum scores are unattainable by even the least or the most forgiving 
respondents.  For example: strictly speaking, could someone who strongly 
agrees to the negative behaviours of “avoid” (22), “ignore” (23), “not speak to 
him/her” (33), and “stay away” (36) also strongly agree to “be biting when talking 
with him/her” (39)—where “him/her” is the very person they are avoiding, 
ignoring, not speaking to, and staying away from?  A conscientious respondent 
would be hard-pressed to respond in a meaningful yet logically consistent 
manner. 
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 In addition to these concerns about specific items, there are wider-
reaching questions as well.  Forgiveness is widely recognized as a process by 
many writers, including Enright himself in many of his writings and in the EFI 
User’s Manual in particular: “forgiveness takes time” and  “may occur slowly” 
(2000, 10, 1).  In addition to the question of whether a single score can 
adequately measure (based upon his or her response to one injury) how 
forgiving a person is to the point where various respondents can be ranked from 
least to most forgiving according to their EFI score, there is also the question of 
what a single score can possibly reflect upon an ongoing process.  If 
forgiveness was a university course, the EFI would be a 100% final examination 
where every student chooses a different question to answer at different times 
throughout the semester.  A similar inventory could measure respondents’ 
proclivity to finish books (PFB) they begin reading by asking them, with 
reference to their current book, how many pages they have read ( P ) and the 
total number of pages in the book ( T ).  One’s PFB score can then be 
determined by the formula P / T  * 100 = PFB, with a possible range of zero to 
100.  There are obviously many objections to be raised about the value of such 
a figure, especially if it were used to rank respondents according to those who 
tend, or tend not, to finish books they begin reading.  There are simply too many 
unconsidered variables involved.  Even if these variables were taken into 
account somehow, a single score derived from a single incident is simply 
inadequate to represent one’s general rate of success in performing a multi-
faceted process.  Neither the EFI nor the PFB score reveals anything about 
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which respondents may actually complete the processes in question.  The 
reader who happens to be on page 10 of a 900-page novel may finish every 
book he or she begins, while the reader who is on page 15 of a 20-page comic 
book may often get distracted and rarely read books through to the end.  In the 
same way, a very forgiving person just recently wronged by a spiteful family 
member may end up forgiving the injury, while a person whose parked car was 
damaged in a hit-and-run accident months ago may no longer harbour harsh 
feelings for the unknown culprit, yet grit his or her teeth every time the remaining 
dent is noticed.  In both of these cases, the wrong person would receive the 
higher score.  As Enright et al. note in the EFI User’s Manual, “ceteris paribus, a 
one-item test is less reliable than a longer one” (2000, 33).  Unfortunately, a 
longer one may not itself be reliable.  Translating the test into a foreign 
language and administering it in another culture will certainly make it no more 
reliable. 
 
3.2 Forgiveness and the Mandarin Enright Forgiveness Inventory 
 While the EFI was developed in the United States, the MEFI is designed 
for use with Mandarin-speaking respondents.  As Yang points out, 
The epistemology and metaphysics found in the predominant Chinese 
philosophies (e.g., Confucianism, Taoism) differ tremendously from the 
ones found in Western traditions, and Chinese people have been found 
to reason and behave differently from other people of other cultures. 
(2001, 666) 
 
Before considering the implications and possible sources of error in the MEFI, 
Western and Chinese cultures will be examined briefly according to two 
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common Western intercultural spectra (low-context/high context cultures and 
individualist/collectivist cultures) as well as a factor identified by the Chinese 
Personality Assessment Inventory, whose developers wanted “to develop an 
indigenous instrument that covered personality characteristics for. . . Chinese 
people instead of depending on the adaptation of available English-language 
scales” (Cheung & Leung, 1998, 240).  Originally designated the Chinese 
Tradition factor, it is now known as the Interpersonal Relatedness factor, since it 
does appear in other cultures as well.  Forgiveness is, by definition, 
interpersonal, so this factor is significant, although “traditional Western theories 
of personality have omitted this important interpersonal dimension (Cheung et 
al., 2001, 425). 
 
3.2.1 Low- and high-context cultures 
 The importance/necessity of “reading between the lines” (or listening to 
“the sound outside the strings”— 弦外之音—xi2n w4i zh9 y9n) during 
interpersonal communication often varies from one culture to another.  In some 
cultures, the message is directly and explicitly stated within the lines 
themselves, while in other cultures what is stated explicitly may be completely 
ignored if the context of the communication is at odds with what is contained in 
the lines.  Gries notes that even in Chinese politics, “It is striking how often the 
actual meaning of a diplomatic statement is the precise opposite of what is 
literally said” (2004, 9).  Edward Hall defines these cultures as low- and high-
context cultures:     
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[In a low-context message] the mass of the information is vested in the 
explicit code. . . .  A high-context communication or message is one in 
which most of the information is either in the physical context or 
internalized in the person while very little is in the coded, explicit, 
transmitted part of the message. (1976, 79) 
 
Buruma ignores this cultural variable when he labels Chinese culture a “culture 
of duplicity” (2001, 13), but he is not the only one, as is evidenced by the “unfair 
and prejudicial stereotypes of the ‘inscrutable’ Asian or of the frank and rude 
Westerner” (Scollon & Scollon, 1995, 2). 
 People from high- and low-context cultures deal with situations of conflict 
in different ways.  In high-context cultures,  
. . . the instrumental issue is intertwined with the person who originated 
that issue.  To openly disagree with someone in public is. . . an extreme 
insult. . . .  [In a low-context setting,] individuals are more efficient in 
separating the conflict issue from the person involved in a conflict over a 
task, and yet remain friends. (Chua & Gudykunst, 1987, 32)   
 
(Note the low-context bias in these descriptions—the authors obviously prefer 
the latter method of dealing with conflict.)  When faced with a conflict, those 
from high-context cultures tend to employ “implicit communication codes, point-
logic style, intuitive-affective rhetoric, and ambiguous, indirect strategies”, while 
individuals from low-context cultures use “explicit communication codes, time-
logic style, rational-factual rhetoric, and open, direct strategies” (Ting-Toomey, 
1985, 82).  Chua and Gudykunst (1987, 34) found Chinese (from a low 
individualistic, high-context culture) and North Americans (from a high 
individualistic, low-context one) to be likely to handle an interpersonal conflict in 
different ways, with the Chinese suggesting that a go-between speak separately 
with the two disputants and the North Americans advising a joint meeting 
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between the two.  Since forgiveness by definition involves interpersonal conflict, 
it is reasonable to assume that North Americans and Chinese may also handle 
forgiveness in different ways.  
 
3.2.2 Individualist and collectivist cultures 
 While cultures may vary in many different ways, “the most important 
cultural dimension in accounting for cultural differences is individualism-
collectivism” (Ohbuchi, Fukushima, & Tedeschi, 1999, 52).  These two systems 
of cultural or social patterns are so often diametrically opposed that the values 
and emphases of the two can easily be set side by side and contrasted in a 
table (see Table 3.1).  In the case of the MEFI, an instrument developed in the 
United States and administered in China, this particular value dimension is 
especially relevant, since Hofstede, in his groundbreaking study, ranked the 
United States number one (i.e., where individualism is most strongly promoted) 
and Taiwan number 36 in his ranking of 40 countries (where 40 is the country 
where collectivism is most strongly promoted—cited in Samovar and 
Porter,1991, 90).  The People’s Republic of China, with a history of much less 
contact with the West than Taiwan, would certainly score no closer to 
individualism than did Taiwan. 
 Western society is highly individualistic, and this emphasis on the 
individual is clearly seen in interpersonal interactions:  since “people are 
expected to take the initiative in advancing their personal interests and well- 
being and to be direct and assertive in interacting with others” (Hu & Grove, 
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Individualism Collectivism 
conceives of social existence as 
     individual-centered 
conceives of social existence as 
     relation-centered 
involves individuals perceiving 
     themselves as relatively  
     independent of others 
involves individuals perceiving 
     themselves as interdependent with 
     others 
emphasizes individual needs, 
     rights, contracts, and attitudes 
emphasizes social norms, obligations,  
     and duties 
gives priority to personal goals  
     and boundaries over group  
     goals and social identity 
gives priority to family or group goals 
     over personal goals 
encourages rational cost-benefit 
     analysis of social 
     relationships 
values social connectedness and 
     commitment even when it is 
     disadvantageous to individuals 
encourages independence and 
     creativity 
encourages obedience and 
     cooperation 
defines a healthy self as one 
     who establishes 
     independence from others 
defines a healthy self as one who is 
     interdependent 
believes that the smallest unit of 
     survival is the individual 
believes that the smallest unit of  
     survival is the collective 
encourages active, assertive, 
     confrontational tactics to  
     resolve conflicts 
encourages passive, collaborative, and 
     avoiding tactics to resolve conflicts 
 
 
 
Table 3.1 Comparison of individualist and collectivist social patterns 
(from Ho, 1982; Hu & Grove, 1999; Ohbuchi et al., 1999; Sandage & Wiens, 
2001; van Hemert, Baerveldt, & Vermande, 2001) 
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1999, 23), it is not surprising that “the eloquent articulation of conviction is 
among the most valued virtues of [American] citizens, and the arts of argument 
and debate are encouraged in the home, school, and marketplace” (Barnlund, 
1989, 101).  Nadler, Nadler, and Broome identify one result of this emphasis 
upon personal interests: “North American individuals are expected to stand up 
for their rights, and this often involves open confrontation” (1985, 109). 
 In contrast, “harmony is one of the primordial values of Confucianism and 
of the Chinese culture” (Ruch, 1989, 273).  In this context, “harmony measures 
one’s inner peace of mind and contentment, as well as interpersonal harmony. 
The avoidance of conflict and maintenance of the equilibrium are considered 
virtues in the Chinese culture” (Cheung et al., 1996).  Wu identifies harmony as 
“the most deep-rooted desire of the Chinese people” (1967, 227), and therefore, 
“the ultimate goal of human behaviour is to achieve ‘harmony’ which leads 
Chinese people to pursue a conflict-free and group-oriented system of human 
relationships” (Chen & Xiao, 1993, 4).  The Mandarin term for “individualism” 
(g8r6nzh&y= —个人主义) literally means “one person doctrine” and is not only 
“often used by the Chinese in a derogatory sense to imply selfishness” (Hu & 
Grove, 1999, 189), but this “individualistic, ‘everyone takes care of him/herself’ 
ethic [is denounced] as inhuman” (Anderson, 1999, 143).   
 Hwang lists several American/Chinese contrasts, all of which could have 
some impact upon the granting or withholding of forgiveness:  “In comparison 
with their American counterparts, Chinese subjects tend to be less autonomous, 
less aggressive, less socially extroverted, more submissive, more conforming, 
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more subservient to authority, and more susceptible to the influence of powerful 
others” (1987, 959).  Forgiveness can only exist in the context of a relationship, 
and Triandis and Suh identify “concern with relationships” as a defining 
characteristic of a collectivist culture.  They also describe how this concern 
results in an un-individualistic way of dealing with conflict: 
Collectivists in conflict situations are primarily concerned with maintaining 
relationships with others, whereas individualists are primarily concerned 
with achieving justice.  Thus, collectivists prefer methods of conflict 
resolution that do not destroy relationships. . . whereas individualists are 
willing to go to court to settle disputes. (2002, 139-140) 
 
The advisability of going to court is vividly described in this Chinese proverb: 
“Better to die of starvation than to become a thief, better to be vexed to death 
than to bring a lawsuit” (饿死不作贼，屈死不告状—8 s- b* zu$ z6i, q% s- b* ga$ 
zhu4ng—Bond & Wang, 1983, 71). 
 The varying emphases of collectivism and individualism can result in 
significant cultural differences that hamper intercultural research.  Kohlberg’s 
theory of moral development was heralded as a description of universal stages, 
but Kohlberg, Snarey, and Reimer admitted in 1983 that “their scoring criteria 
are biased towards reasoning with an individualistic rather than collectivistic 
content” (Vine, 1986, 438).  Scoring criteria for other Western intercultural 
instruments may be similarly biased towards individualistic content, even 
though, as Triandis points out, “about 70% of the population of the world lives in 
collective cultures” (cited in Samovar & Porter, 1991, 90). 
  
 
 50
3.2.3 The Interpersonal Relatedness factor 
 Although Ohbuchi et al. (1999) claim that the most important factor in 
accounting for cultural differences is individualism and collectivism, this 
dichotomy is a Western construct and claims for its universality may be 
overstated.  King & Bond argue that “the Confucian conception of man cannot 
be neatly characterized by Western concepts of individualism or holism and 
should be considered in its own terms. . . .  traditional Chinese society is neither 
individual-based nor society-based, but relation-based” (1985, 31).  Their 
observation is supported by the Chinese Personality Assessment Inventory 
(CPAI), a multiphasic personality inventory “that is relevant to the Chinese 
people, a population that is about one quarter of humanity” (Cheung et al., 1996, 
182).  One of its four personality factors is the Interpersonal Relatedness factor, 
a factor that “cannot be encompassed by the Big Five factors” (Cheung et al., 
2001, 41—the Big Five (supposedly universal) factors of personality are 
Surgency, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and 
Openness).  Personality characteristics which were deemed of interest to 
Chinese people but neglected in imported personality inventories include the 
following: 
Harmony, which refers to one’s inner peace of mind, contentment, 
interpersonal harmony, avoidance of conflict, and maintenance of 
equilibrium; 
 
Ren Qing (relationship orientation), which covers adherence to cultural 
norms of interaction based on reciprocity, exchange of social favours, 
and exchange of affection according to implicit rules. . . . 
 
Ah-Q Mentality (defensiveness), which is based on a character in a 
popular Chinese novel in which the defence mechanisms of the Chinese 
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people, including self-protective rationalization, externalization of blame, 
and belittling others’ achievements, are satirized; 
 
Face, which depicts the pattern of orientations in an interpersonal and 
hierarchical connection and social behaviours to enhance one’s face and 
to avoid losing one’s face. (Cheung & Leung, 2001, 408) 
 
The very existence of the Interpersonal Relatedness factor, a factor that “was 
found to stand apart from the presumably universal five-factor structure” 
(Cheung & Leung, 1998, 243) supports those researchers who have argued that 
Western “theories and findings may be shaped by the cultural background of the 
researchers and that their validity should not be taken for granted when they are 
exported to non-Western countries” (Cheung et al., 2001, 429).  This is of 
particular importance in the field of forgiveness research in particular, where 
British therapists Ransley & Spy offer this caveat regarding Ransley’s overview 
of the forgiveness literature: “almost all of [it]. . . stems from the USA” (2004, 7). 
If Chinese (not Western) researchers dominated the field of personality research, 
while using the CPAI (not the Big Five model) as their major instrument for 
research, the leading theory of personality structure would see “the merging of 
the Conscientiousness and Agreeableness factors, the exclusion of the 
Openness factor, and the inclusion of the Interpersonal Relatedness factor” 
(Cheung et al., 2001, 429).  Under the present circumstances, the Interpersonal 
Relatedness factor remains untapped by Western personality inventories, and 
these inventories thus fail to take into account an important dimension of the 
Chinese personality.  Cheung et al. (2001, 426) ask the consequential question: 
“What, then, would be the deficiencies arising from the reliance on these 
theories and instruments in understanding the Chinese personality?” 
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 Based on these three cultural dimensions (low- and high-context, 
individualist/collectivist, and the Interpersonal Relatedness factor) Western 
culture and Chinese culture exhibit major differences, and in many instances 
seem to hold diametrically opposed values.  Van de Vivjer and Leung’s general 
caveat applies to the MEFI, developed in one culture, administered in the other, 
in particular: 
When the cultural differences between the groups of subjects involved in 
a cross-cultural study are extensive, it does not make much sense to 
assume the validity of the “all other things being equal” argument and to 
compare the groups as if the data were collected in a true experiment. 
(1997, 260) 
 
 
3.2.4 Issues in intercultural research 
 Anthropologist Edward Hall identifies a common motivation for 
intercultural research: “Most cross-cultural exploration begins with the 
annoyance of being lost” (cited in Bond, 1995, 192).  Researchers have 
discovered that attempts to lessen their annoyance often only increase their 
frustration.  An early effort to demonstrate the universality of human emotions is 
illustrative of the hazards of intercultural research.  In their discussion of 
differential emotions theory, Izard and Buechler identify ten fundamental 
emotions which are “innate, transcultural phenomena. . . .  These emotion 
processes are recognized and identified as part of the human experience by 
individuals from widely varying cultural backgrounds” (1980, 167).  Wierzbicka  
questions these claims: if they “are supposed to enumerate universal human 
emotions, how is it that these emotions are all so neatly identified by means of 
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English words?” (1992, 19).  After offering one example of a language which 
lacks a corresponding term for one of the “universal” emotions and another 
example of a language which subsumes two of the emotions into one term, she 
cautions,  
English terms of emotion constitute a folk taxonomy, not an objective, 
culture-free analytical framework, so obviously we cannot assume that 
English words. . . are clues to universal human concepts or to basic 
psychological realities.  Yet words such as these are usually treated as 
if they were objective, culture-free “natural kinds”.  (1992, 119) 
 
(In the case of the EFI, two items directly correspond to Izard and Buechler’s 
“ten fundamental emotions” (“anger” and “disgust”), and several items are 
loosely connected to “interest”, “joy”, and “contempt”, which are also purported 
to be “innate, transcultural phenomena”.) 
 
  3.2.4.1 Etics and emics 
 Establishing equivalence (i.e., determining if the concept being 
investigated, as well as the way the concept is measured, have the same 
meaning in different cultures) involves a consideration of etics and emics.  Pike 
(1967, 37) coined these words from “phonetics” (the study of all possible human 
vocal sounds) and “phonemics” (the study of the significant sounds in a given 
language).  Brislin describes etics as  
. . . culture-common concepts. . . that can be found among people all 
over the world. . . . [Etics are based upon the] demands people face in 
their desire for survival and the survival of their community. . . . [such 
as] maintaining harmony among people so that disagreements do not 
result in violence. (2000, 83) 
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Emics are  
. . . culture-specific concepts [that] are found in some societies, but not 
others.  These concepts represent a culture’s unique adaptations to the 
demands it faces.  Often, culture-specific concepts represent additions 
to or variants on the culture common concepts familiar to all people. 
(83) 
 
Complex concepts often feature an etic core with emic colourings.  In the case 
of forgiveness, the etic core is the maintenance of harmony within a society.  
Forgiveness, along with condoning, excusing, and forbearing (which have all 
been proposed as examples of what forgiveness is not—Coyle & Enright, 1998; 
Downie, 1965; Enright, Gassin & Wu, 1992; Govier, 2002; Kolnai, 1973-1974; 
Park, 1998) are possible emic colourings that may appear in a particular culture.  
The emic colouring of forgiveness not only tints the etic of harmony but is itself 
coloured by a rainbow of different facets.  As Dana observes, “almost all 
standard tests developed in the United States are culture-specific, typically 
based on Anglo-American emics in origin, and properly referred to as pseudo-
etics” (1997, 121).  If the EFI and MEFI do not provide equivalent measures of 
forgiveness in the West and in China, they are not the only standard tests to 
replace etics with pseudo-etics. 
 
3.2.4.2 Equivalence 
 Three specific types of equivalence can be examined: translation 
equivalence (in which difficult-to-translate items often highlight emic features of 
one culture which, precisely because of their emicity, are difficult or impossible 
to translate into the language of another culture), conceptual equivalence (in 
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which it is assumed that the same purpose is served across different cultures by 
different aspects of a concept), and scalar equivalence (the assumption that a 
scale, or metric, measures exactly the same concept in two cultures, and that 
the resulting scores are directly comparable). 
 Translation equivalence is most often determined through the use of 
back-translation (i.e., the translated questionnaire is translated back into its 
original language and these results are compared with the original to identify 
any discrepancies).  While the MEFI is written in the traditional (complex) 
Mandarin characters that are used in Taiwan and Hong Kong, the differences 
between these characters and the simplified characters used on the mainland of 
China have no effect upon the meanings of the characters.  For this study, four 
graduate students were asked to translate the MEFI into English.  Two were 
English major students in the School of Foreign Languages at China West 
Normal University and two were Chinese majors in the College of Chinese at 
the same university.  (Selected responses are found in Appendix D.  Translators 
1 and 2 are English majors and Translators 3 and 4 are Chinese majors.)   
 Back-translated items were divided into three groups according to how 
closely the words or phrases suggested by the translators matched the original 
EFI items: those where all four translators offered the same word or a synonym; 
those where there was a lack of agreement among the translators; and those 
where the translators offered suggestions that were consistent but not 
synonymous with the original EFI items.  In all, 75% of the items fell into the first 
group—the translators’ suggestions were exactly the same as the EFI items or 
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were virtually synonymous.  These items were not spread evenly throughout the 
sub-scales, as all but three of the affect items and all but four of the cognition 
items were successfully back-translated, while only twelve of the twenty 
behaviour items were problem-free.  This may be due to the number of items 
within each subscale that are presumably easier to translate because they are 
comprised of only a single word (affect: 20/20, cognition: 9/20, and behaviour: 
4/20).  As Eco notes, “for isolated words there is a dictionary, [but] sentences 
designate states of affairs which are not registered by any dictionary”  
(2003, 175).   
 The translators failed to provide consistent translations for two items: 
“resentment (#10/NA—here, the number refers to the item’s number in the 
EFI, while NA signifies a Negative item in the Affective subscale; “P” will 
represent positive items and “B” and “C” will represent the behaviour and 
cognitive subscales)” and “put him/her down (#26/NB)”.  “Resentment” came 
out as “disgusting” twice, and as “abominable” and “be sick of”.  All three of 
these responses lack the initial offense that one could, according to the 
English word, resent.  Especially in this context (where “him/her” is someone 
who has deeply hurt the respondent), the difference between negative 
feelings prompted by the hurtful action itself (resentment) and more general 
negative feelings (disgusted, sick of) may be significant.  Two translators 
responded to Number 26 with “to be against him”, and the other two 
suggested “sing a different tune to him”.  Putting a person down involves 
some kind of negative remark, but the two back-translations seem more to 
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involve malice and contrariness.  (“Sing a different tune” here is a literal 
translation from the Mandarin and means contradicting everything another 
person says—an intentional “you say ‘to-may-to’, I say ‘to-mah-to’” strategy).  
The English item need not involve any face-to-face interaction with the 
offender, but the Mandarin item requires such an interaction. 
 In 13 cases, the translators’ suggestions differed (to a greater or lesser 
degree) from the EFI items.  In ten of these, the translators were unanimous in 
their disagreement with the MEFI item, and in the other instances three of the 
four translators add components that are not present in the EFI items.  For 
example, for “attend his/her party (#40-PB)”, three translators add “or activities”.  
This accurately represents the MEFI item which does not stop at the mention of 
the party (which would almost certainly involve a meal), but goes on to include 
“other activities”.  Why this was added is unclear, but perhaps the original 
translator considered that since in Taiwan most reconciliations involve a 
banquet hosted by the offender (Sheldon Sawatzky, long-term teacher/ 
administrator in Taiwan, personal communication via e-mail, April 13, 2002), 
and since in China the refusal of such an invitation is very serious and may 
signal the end of a relationship, the addition of “other activities” was thought to 
be a more faithful translation of the item’s intent. 
 For “immoral (#49-NC)”, three translators include a “go to hell” 
component.  While both items are negative, the MEFI version is much harsher 
than the EFI one.  For “corrupt (#52-NC)”, three translators add the idea of 
society or community, and this may again serve to make the MEFI version 
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harsher than the EFI version as it emphasizes the effects of corruption on 
society as a whole and would conjure up images of specific abuses of power by 
someone in an official position. 
 Among the ten items where the translators consistently disagreed with 
the EFI terms, five items reflect a difference in degree, while the others 
introduce completely different ideas.  For “cold (#13-NA)”, all four suggested 
“indifferent”, which is more passive and less harsh than the EFI item.  “Affection 
(#18-PA)” was translated “enthusiasm”, which carries with it somewhat different 
connotations.  For “lend him/her a hand (#32-PB)”, all four include difficult 
circumstances as well as feelings of pity or sympathy, which suggest a more 
serious and more touching situation than does the EFI item.  The translators 
faithfully translated “disapprove of him/her (#55-NC)” literally: “he is rubbish”.  
To think of the person as garbage, with no redeeming qualities whatsoever, is 
certainly harsher than disapproving of the person—or more likely disapproving 
of one of his or her habits or actions.  “Condemn the person (#58-NC)” also 
comes out harsher in the MEFI, as all four translators suggested “the person 
deserves death”.  It should be noted that these differences in degree are 
present in the MEFI—the translators arrived at similar back-translations that 
disagreed with the EFI items because the MEFI items themselves were different 
in degree from the original items. 
 In some cases, the difference between the EFI term and the 
corresponding MEFI term is not simply a difference in degree but rather a 
complete difference in meaning.  “Show friendship (#21-PB)”, is “respect” in the 
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MEFI.  While it is possible for one to show a grudging respect for someone, it 
need hardly be an example of positive behaviour, and in a hierarchical society 
like China showing respect may have nothing at all to do with how one would 
like to behave.  “Reach out to him/her (#30-PB)” includes the components of 
intentionality and difficult circumstances, and two translators point out that it will 
be “a great help” or “a big hand”, which is specified in the MEFI item.  This 
intentionality component refers to one’s motivation to reaching out, and in this 
case, the implication is that one is reaching out not in an altruistic way, but that 
one is reaching out with ulterior motives for future benefit, so this item also may 
not always reflect a positive behaviour.  At the same time, such ulterior motives 
may not be as sinister as they would seem in the West, since “Chinese often 
consciously or unconsciously expect to get something in return when they do a 
favour to others” (Chen, 2001, 63).  The MEFI item “do a favour (#37-PB)” 
comes out specifically as “do a small favour”, while in the EFI it is up to the 
respondent to decide how small or large the favour will be.  Another item that 
becomes more specific in the MEFI is “aid him/her when in trouble (#38-PB)”.  In 
the MEFI, the aid is explicitly and only financial aid.  While “be biting when 
talking with him/her (#39-NB)” requires actually speaking with the offender, the 
MEFI  version of the item makes no mention of actually speaking, but rather 
describes “a threatening manner”, showing hostility, making “threatening 
gestures” and being “fierce and quarrelsome”.   
 While this last set of items most clearly reveals a lack of translation 
equivalence, the other items shown to exhibit differences in degree and 
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confusion among the translators also show that there are problems.  Obviously 
some of the discrepancies between the EFI and the MEFI are intentional 
changes made by the translator(s) and not simply errors in translation.  
Unnecessarily replacing “friendship” with “respect” (#21), changing “favour” to 
“small favour” (#37), limiting “aid” to “financial aid” (#38), and expanding “party” 
to include “other activities” (#40) suggests an intentional effort to perhaps, in 
some way, make the MEFI more “culturally equivalent”, though it is difficult to 
discern that this has been done with any consistency.  Cheung et al. offer this 
warning to translators who do more than simply translate: 
To revise the scale by deleting. . . or by adding new items. . . [will] have 
changed the original meaning of the scale and thus will limit the 
applicability of the empirical research findings of the original instrument.  
To a certain extent, the revised scale may be considered a new 
instrument.  (1996, 182) 
 
Judging from the back-translations provided by the four translators, 45 of the 
MEFI items are equivalent to their EFI counterparts, but 15 of the items, to a 
greater or lesser degree, exhibit translation non-equivalence.   
 The EFI was designed to be used interculturally, and the developers 
followed (in part) van de Vijver and Leung’s advice for developing an instrument 
that can be used across cultures: “In an early stage of a project the question has 
to be raised whether the same instrument can be applied in all cultural groups” 
(1997, 264).  The developers of the EFI “aimed at developing the EFI in a 
simple format in order to facilitate administration and translation into different 
languages” (Enright et al., 2000, 27).  While the developers attempted to make 
the EFI easy to translate, translation, of necessity, involves a second party, and 
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simply providing a supposedly easy-to-translate document is not enough to 
ensure a good translation.  As mentioned above, several items are very nearly 
synonymous, if not completely indistinguishable, and to accurately translate 
such subtle shades of meaning would surely present a translator with a daunting 
task.  As Eco points out, a successful translation requires more than a good 
dictionary: “Translation is always a shift, not between two languages but 
between two cultures. . . .  A translator must take into account rules that are not 
strictly linguistic but, broadly speaking, cultural” (2003, 82).  The EFI translators 
also faced a daunting question: “Should a translation lead the reader to 
understand the linguistic and cultural universe of the source text, or transform 
the original by adapting it to the reader’s cultural and linguistic universe?” (Eco, 
2003, 89).  Those who produced the MEFI, either consciously or by default, 
followed the former of the two options.  As respondents complete the inventory, 
they are very much within Enright’s cultural universe, although they may have 
very little understanding of it—indeed, they may not even be aware that they 
have left their own “linguistic and cultural universe”.  In the case of the MEFI, the 
concern of the EFI developers for translation equivalence is certainly justified, 
but no mention is made of any similar attempts to facilitate conceptual and 
scalar equivalence.  
 Conceptual equivalence, especially when the concept is a complex one, 
is difficult to establish.  While there is much evidence of dissimilarity between 
China and the West in general, there is little to suggest that Western and 
Chinese “forgiveness” are equivalent.   
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 Examples of scalar (metric) equivalence are, as Brislin points out, 
“clearest in their misuse. . . . [as] people often assume metric equivalence 
exists. . . rather than think about the complexities of emics, etics, and 
conceptual equivalencies” (2000, 103).  In this case, assuming scalar 
equivalence, a Canadian scoring 275 on the EFI would be judged less forgiving 
than a Chinese scoring 285 on the MEFI.  While Brislin cautions that “arguments 
for metric equivalence should be made only when researchers have extensive 
evidence to support their claims” (2000, 107), commentators who question the 
very existence of forgiveness itself within Chinese culture would certainly 
question the metric equivalence of the EFI/MEFI.  There is no evidence to 
support the metric equivalence of the EFI and the MEFI, although such 
equivalence has been assumed (e.g., Park & Enright, 2000).   
 
3.2.4.3 Other concerns 
 Concerns have also been raised about the form a questionnaire takes, 
and whether or not the very format of the instrument, regardless of its content, is 
free of cultural bias.  Bond questions the validity of applying a Likert scale 
questionnaire interculturally—and questions its value not only in Japanese, but 
also in English:  
These [response] labels were, as usual, converted into numerical 
scores from five to one, implying, indeed requiring, psychologically 
equidistant steps from one label to the next. . . .  one would have 
legitimate concerns about whether they were equidistant in Japanese 
(let alone in English!). (1995, 195).   
 
The EFI offers the following response options: Strongly Disagree; Disagree; 
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Somewhat Disagree; Somewhat Agree; Agree; Strongly Agree.  For scoring the 
EFI, responses to positive items are scored from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 6 
(Strongly Agree), while responses to negative items are reverse scored, with 
Strongly Agree scored as 1 and Strongly Disagree scored as 6.  The EFI total 
score is obtained by adding the scores of all 60 items, with a possible range of 
60-360.   
 In the MEFI, the corresponding responses are 非常不同意 (f5ich2ng b* 
t@ngy9); 不同意 (b* t@ngy9); 有一点不同意 (y#u y9 di3n b* t@ngy9); 有一点同意 
(y#u y9 di3n t@ngy9); 同意 (t@ngy9); 非常同意 (f5ich2ng t@ngy9).  As Bond 
suggests, it may not be the case that strongly agreeing with one positive item, 
somewhat disagreeing with two, disagreeing with three, and strongly 
disagreeing with six (all resulting in a score of 6) show equivalent degrees of 
forgiveness and should contribute equally to one’s final score.  Even if they can 
be shown to be equivalent in English, there is nothing to suggest that the 
Chinese responses are similarly comparable.  The Chinese phrase 
corresponding to “strongly” (非常—f5ich2ng) was back-translated into English 
by the four translators in four different ways, as “awfully”, “extremely”, 
“completely”, and “absolutely”.  While the first two express a very high degree, 
as does the original English adverb, the latter two express states of total 
agreement or disagreement, which are on a qualitatively different level.  This 
may make Chinese respondents less likely to choose the extreme responses.  
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Other cultural considerations may also inhibit Chinese respondents from 
selecting the “strongly dis/agree” responses. 
 There is a question as to whether differences between final EFI/MEFI 
scores reflect actual cultural differences related to forgiveness or whether they 
reflect different cultural tendencies in responding to Likert scale questionnaires.  
Obuchi et al. claim that, in general, “individualists tend to choose more extreme 
values on scales than do collectivists” (1999, 59).  Comparing American and 
Chinese scores on such a questionnaire, when Americans are more likely to feel 
free to respond with any of six options and their Chinese counterparts are likely 
to limit their responses to only four (or perhaps two) of the six options, is clearly 
problematic.  Choosing “agree” rather than “strongly agree” for positive items 
and “disagree” rather than “strongly disagree” for negative ones could reduce 
one’s total score by about 16%—as many as 60 points.  In such a case the total 
MEFI score would reflect more upon a cultural aversion to extremes than upon 
any degree of forgiveness. 
 That thoughts, feelings, and behaviours all contribute equally to the MEFI 
score also raises a question.  Behaviours generally require more effort than do 
thoughts and feelings.  Should the items measuring behaviour be weighted 
more heavily in the total score calculation in recognition that committing to a 
certain course of action requires more of a commitment than simply to entertain, 
for example,  “friendly (#19)” feelings or “nice (#51)” thoughts?   
 The section on behaviour is problematic for another reason as well.  
Among the twenty items comprising the behaviour portion of the EFI, the 
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following items do not appear:  
Regarding the person, I do or would join with him/her in slaying a black 
 dog, cutting it in half, and pouring its blood along a fence. 
Regarding the person, I do or would suckle his/her baby. 
Regarding the person, I do or would brush off the three piles of dirt that 
 he/she places upon my thigh after crawling to me on hands and 
 knees. 
Regarding the person, I do or would recite an account of his/her misdeed 
 while he/she engages in painful head washing.   
These items may well have appeared in the EFI if it had been prepared by an 
African scholar of forgiveness, because these African rituals are all symbolic of 
forgiveness (Augsburger, 1992, 276).  While a Western respondent would likely 
marvel at the strangeness of these behaviours if they were included in the EFI, 
an African (or Chinese) respondent may be equally bewildered by the items that 
presently appear. 
 In addition to translation and cultural concerns, the currently available 
MEFI makes it virtually impossible for Chinese respondents to score higher than 
American EFI respondents.  While the total score of the EFI ranges from a low 
of 60 to a high of 360, it is mathematically impossible for anyone taking the 
MEFI to score more than 300.  At the same time, it is possible for someone to 
receive a MEFI score lower than 60—in fact, it is possible for a Chinese 
respondent to receive a score of zero.  The reason for these disparities is that 
the MEFI Likert responses are inexplicably converted to different numerical 
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values than are the EFI responses.  While EFI responses are converted into 
numerical scores ranging from 1 to 6, MEFI responses are given values from 
zero to 5.  These differing values make it impossible even to suggest that EFI 
and MEFI scores are somehow comparable, but like the erratic numbering of 
the 60 MEFI items (starting not with number one, but running 5, 6, 7, 8, 5, 6, 7, 
8, 9, 10-20, and then jumping to 61-100) changes are easily, though perhaps 
grudgingly, made.  (The EFI is now available through Mind Garden, Inc., and in 
their sample EFI questions, the options are listed as “strongly disagree”, 
“disagree”, slightly disagree”, “slightly disagree”, “agree”, and “strongly agree”—
Mind Garden Inc., 2004.  This error, if it appears on the EFI itself, is less easily 
rectified than the mistakes on the MEFI.)  
 Enright and his colleague from Taiwan, Tina Huang, identify yet another 
intercultural variable that may complicate research: varying degrees of willing 
self-disclosure among respondents from different cultures.  As they explain, “In 
order to be civil and to show respect for others, Taiwanese people are more 
hesitant to overtly demonstrate anger than Americans may be. . . .  Thus we 
have the problem of a client saying that he or she is not angry, but feeling anger 
inward” (Huang & Enright, 2000, 72).  This discrepancy between outward 
display and inner feeling is a problematic complication for Western researchers, 
but is “normal” for those living in a collectivistic Chinese culture:   
Chinese persons are not subject to the same pressures for consistency 
between inner beliefs and outer behaviour as are Westerners. . . .  Such 
[“inconsistent”] behaviour is not construed as hypocritical or insincere as 
it would be by Westerners; rather it is a culturally sanctioned mechanism 
enabling the individual to maintain a harmonious relationship with the 
external world. (King & Bond, 1985, 35) 
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Certainly this tendency to downplay existing negative feelings among 
Taiwanese MEFI respondents (and perhaps a corresponding tendency to 
exaggerate positive feelings) would certainly lead to skewed MEFI scores that 
will not be directly comparable to EFI scores, especially scores from cultures 
where consistency between inner beliefs and outer behaviour is expected. 
 Another cultural difference that will affect MEFI scores is identified by Ma, 
who found that “Chinese subjects showed a stronger orientation to perform 
affective and altruistic acts to first kin, close relatives, and best friends than did 
their English counterparts” (1992, 61).  This suggests that one’s responses to 
the MEFI would vary considerably depending upon the closeness of the 
offender, and that while Chinese subjects might be expected to score higher 
than Westerners when the chosen offender is close to the respondent, they may 
score lower when the offender is not close to the respondent. 
 While there are serious questions about how accurately the EFI total 
score itself reflects a respondent’s level of forgiveness, the MEFI total score 
must answer not only those questions, but also the many others that arise from 
its status as a Western instrument translated into another language and 
administered in another culture. 
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Chapter Four 
“FORGIVENESS” IN CHINA 
4.1 The results of the questionnaire 
 As noted in Chapter One, the questionnaire was administered to Chinese 
university students—not with the assumption that “university student” constitutes 
an infallible standard category for intercultural comparison, but with the 
assumption that, since future researchers would likely select such students as 
respondents to the MEFI, it would thus be most helpful to explore Chinese 
conceptions of forgiveness among students in particular.  In fact, no assumption 
is made that the students in this study are even representative of Chinese 
university students in general.  As Education students majoring in English, they 
are more “Westernized” than their non-English major colleagues by virtue of 
their coursework and their contact with Western teachers.  These students 
would be more likely to understand forgiveness (in the Western sense) than 
other Chinese students, and if these students show a lack of understanding, 
Chinese university students in general could be expected to show even less 
understanding. 
 Since this is very much an exploratory study, survey responses are 
examined with descriptive statistics in an attempt to reveal respondents’ 
understandings of forgiveness according to the definition upon which the EFI 
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(and by extension the MEFI) is based (Enright, Rique, & Coyle, 2000, 1).  Some 
survey questions required responses in Mandarin Chinese, and in this 
discussion such responses are referred to by assigned numbers, rather than by 
the actual Mandarin characters themselves.  All of the Mandarin characters are 
provided in the appendices, but they do not appear in the text of this discussion.  
Survey results will be presented in the form of frequency distribution tables, and 
the discussion presents the general results for each question.  In many cases, 
the English word “forgiveness” is used to translate Mandarin terms—while this 
may or may not be appropriate, it is unavoidable.  The chapter closes with a 
series of conclusions based upon these results.  
 One of the major considerations in a study that involves the comparison 
of one concept in two cultures (and two languages) is this: how can one identify 
the target concept in the other culture (using that culture’s language) when the 
concept may not even exist in the other culture?  Translating the names of 
certain Chinese food items is sometimes difficult, if not impossible, since no 
English terms are, understandably, available for food items that are not 
available in the West.  It should not be surprising that translating a complex 
concept from one language to another is difficult when finding a concise English 
term for a popular Chinese children’s snack—a congealed lump of warm 
glutinous rice covered with ground sugar and peanuts—is problematic. 
 In this study, respondents were not presented with a Chinese term for 
forgiveness.  The decision was made to design a survey that can be 
administered only to respondents who have studied English so that they can 
 70
provide their own translation of the word.  They are not asked to simply translate 
the term: in Question 1 of the survey, respondents were asked to suggest the 
“Mandarin Chinese word [that] would best fill in the blank” in front of Enright’s 
definition of forgiveness.  Respondents were asked to write their response in 
Box 1.  As the Mandarin term that best fits the definition of forgiveness, the 
character in Box 1 is essentially a translation of the English word.  Question 2 
asks for a translation of “tolerance” in the same manner, using a definition of 
tolerance based on Smith (1997, 32-33).  This Mandarin character is placed in 
Box 2.  (In further discussion here, these responses will be referred to simply as 
Box 1—i.e., the Mandarin translation of forgiveness—and Box 2—i.e., the 
Mandarin translation of tolerance.)  If these questions were asked of native 
English speakers, the range of responses would be relatively narrow, although it 
would be a useful experiment to see which words native speakers would 
associate with these definitions and to see how widely their responses vary.   
 In this case, the 130 respondents suggested a total of 57 different words 
and phrases for the two definitions: 33 for Question 1, and 37 for Question 2.  
(For practical reference purposes, these responses have been listed 
alphabetically and numbered from 1 to 57, as shown in Appendix C.)  Here, 
responses are identified only by their number—e.g., ku1n r@ng (宽容) is referred 
to as #23.)  Several of the responses are given only once in Question 1 (23 in 
all), and once in Question 2 (22).  While 20 responses offered for Box 1 are not 
suggested for Box 2 and 24 responses given in Box 2 never appear in Box 1, 
many of the words (13) are suggested for both Questions 1 and 2 by different 
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respondents.  This apparent confusion is not unique to these respondents—
Chinese-English dictionaries also suggest that one Mandarin character can 
mean both “forgiveness” and “tolerance”—e.g., #2 and #48 (these are included 
in Question 3 as Items O and J, and their definitions are given in Appendix B).  
The most frequently suggested characters for both questions, interestingly, 
belong to this latter group. 
 For Question 1, the four most frequently suggested words are #23 
(suggested by 43.1% of respondents), #24 (12.3%), #7 (9%), and #2 (9%).  Two 
of these words also appear in the list of the four most frequently suggested 
words for Question 2: #45 (24.6%), #56 (16.9%), #2 (7.7%), and #23 (6.2%).  
Third-ranking #2 ranks fourth among the 33 different responses to Question 1, 
and fourth-ranking #23 appears in Question 1 as the most frequent response 
(see Figure 4.1).  Obviously, respondents perceived some overlapping of 
concepts as they considered Questions 1 and 2. 
 While 43.1% of respondents suggested #23 for Box 1, the two most 
frequently suggested words for Box 2, #45 and #58, are given by a combined 
total of 41.3%.  In that sense, the definition of forgiveness elicits a more unified 
response than does the definition of tolerance.  (For responses to Question 1, 
see Figure 4.2, where the asterisk indicates the 23 responses given only once: 
3, 4, 9, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 26, 27, 28, 31, 35, 39, 41, 43, 46, 49, 50, 55, 
56; for responses to Question 2, see Figure 4.3, where the asterisk indicates the 
22 responses given only once: 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 18, 21, 27, 29, 30, 32, 33, 
34, 43, 48, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57). 
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Figure 4.1 Four most frequent responses to Questions 1 and 2 
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Figure 4.2 Responses to Question 1 
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Figure 4.3 Responses to Question 2 
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 Question 3 lists 16 Mandarin characters and asks respondents to indicate 
whether each item is synonymous with their response in Box 1, Box 2, both, or 
neither.  Most of these terms are defined as “forgiveness” or “tolerance” (or 
both), but some are defined as “endurance” (Items A and E), “magnanimous” 
(Item P), and “accept” (Item C—see Appendix B for definitions of all the terms).  
Responses to these items vary widely (see Figure 4.4).  Not a single possible 
option is left unchosen by the respondents—each of the 16 items is selected by 
at least five respondents (3.8%) as being either synonymous with Box 1, 
synonymous with Box 2, synonymous with both Boxes 1 and 2, or synonymous 
with neither Box 1 nor Box 2. 
 All of the terms listed in Question 3 appear as suggestions for Box 1 or 2, 
with the exception of Item A, although the majority of respondents indicated in 
Question 3 that Item A is either synonymous with Box 1, Box 2, or both (61.5%).  
Item A ranks as the item most indicated to mean both Box 1 and Box 2 (36.9%), 
so perhaps it is not suggested in Questions 1 or 2 as being synonymous with 
either Box 1 or Box 2 because it encompasses both meanings.  On the other 
hand, Item A is also the top-ranking option for “neither” (38.5%), which would 
also explain its complete absence from responses to Questions 1 and 2. 
 Another surprising result in Question 3 is that the item here most 
frequently identified with Box 1, Item G, appears as a response in Question 1 
only twice.  Why did only 1.5% of the respondents identify Item G with Enright’s 
definition in Question 1 while 64.6% go on to identify Item G with the term they 
suggest for Box 1?  It seems that while Item G does not match Enright’s 
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definition, it is, in many cases, synonymous with words that do match the 
definition.  These responses to Item G, along with those to Item A, and indeed 
those to all of the other items, which are each identified as being synonymous 
with Box 1, Box 2, both, or neither, suggest that the definitions presented in 
Questions 1 and 2 do not lend themselves easily to translation into Mandarin. 
 Question 4 asked respondents to again make use of their answers to 
Questions 1 and 2 (i.e., Boxes 1 and 2).  The question consists of 26 Chinese 
sayings.  Sayings, according to Gries, “are particularly useful at revealing deeply 
rooted, if not always realized ideals that form the basis for Chinese perspectives 
and behaviour” (2004, 153).  Respondents were asked to identify if the saying 
“is more closely connected to the word in Box 1 or Box 2”.  These sayings were 
selected from among hundreds of responses given by graduate students at 
China West Normal University over a three-year period when they were asked 
to suggest Chinese sayings about forgiveness as part of a homework 
assignment for their first-year oral English class.  Some of the chosen sayings 
promote what seems to be forgiveness, while others promote what seems to be 
revenge.  The latter were included because although “revenge and forgiveness. 
. . mark ends of a spectrum. . . of attitudinal responses to wrongdoing” (Govier, 
2002, vii), sayings promoting revenge can be considered to be sayings 
discouraging forgiveness, since “forgiveness is the exact opposite of 
vengeance” (Arendt, 1998, 240).  Respondents were explicitly instructed that 
“the saying may refer to either the presence or the absence of the ideas in 
Boxes 1 and 2”.  All of the items in Question 3 were considered, by the 
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student(s) who suggested them, as having something to do with forgiveness (in 
the English sense of the word as they understood it). 
  Of the 26 sayings offered in Question 4, eleven are identified with Box 1 
by a majority of the respondents: Q and Z (68% each), L (60%), B (62%), E and 
J (59% each), N (58%), R (57%), A (56%), C (55%), and D (54%).  These 
sayings will now be discussed in depth.  The remaining sayings are identified 
with Box 1 by 40% or less of the respondents. 
 Two items are most frequently identified with Enright’s definition of 
forgiveness: Items Q—“Never remember the wrongdoings of others”, and Z—
“The sea is bigger than the land; The sky is bigger than the sea; Man’s heart is 
bigger than the sky”.  Item Q suggests that the equivalent of forgiveness is not 
remembering an offence (i.e., forgetting), but the EFI user’s manual explicitly 
states that “forgiveness is not forgetting” (Enright et al., 2000, 2; cf. Augsburger, 
1996; Cole, Mitchell, Monroe, & Laughlin, 1999; Dillon, 2001; Konstam, 
Chernoff, & Deveney, 2001; Lang, 1994; Murphy & Hampton, 1988; Rodden, 
1997; Smedes, 2001; and Witvliet, 2001.  Govier suggests that “the appeal of 
the cliché [‘forgive and forget’]. . . may owe more to its alliterative qualities than 
to common sense or ordinary experience”—2002, 60). 
 As for Item Z, its emphasis on “capacity of heart” is very similar to three 
other items in the top eleven: A—“The sea can accommodate one hundred 
rivers; its volume is huge”; B—“A chancellor’s heart is large enough to pole a 
boat in”; and C—“A great man has great capacity”.  In A, “accommodate” is 
translated from 容—r@ng, which is defined primarily as “hold; contain”, but has 
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the secondary definition of “tolerate” (Wei, 2002, 1035).  In C, “capacity” is 
translated from 量—li4ng : “capacity for tolerance or for taking food or drink” 
(Wei, 2002, 755).  This sense of capacity and accommodation is reminiscent of 
the Latin term magnanimus (literally, “great-souled”—Morris, 1981, 784; 
rendered in English as “magnanimous”: “showing . . . a lofty and courageous 
spirit. . . nobility of feeling and generosity of mind. . . . enabling one to bear 
trouble calmly, to disdain meanness and revenge, and to make sacrifices for 
worthy ends”—Mish, 1983, 716).  These four items are clearly more closely 
related to Box 2 than to Box 1. 
 Item L—“Forgiveness is a good virtue” includes the Mandarin character 
used in Item K in Question 3, which is identified with Box 1 by 58% of the 
respondents (although as mentioned earlier, Wei defines the term as 
“tolerance”—2002, 700).  Item N—“When you can forgive a person, you should” 
includes the Mandarin character used in Item B in Question 3, which 42% of 
respondents identify with Box 1.  Both of these are seen by a majority of 
respondents as being connected with the definition of forgiveness. 
 Two items feature the same grammatical construction: “convert. . . into . . .” 
(化……为…… —hu4. . . w6i. . .).  Accomplishing Items E—“Convert an enemy into 
a friend” and D—“Convert weapons of warfare into gifts of jade and silk” 
involves reconciliation, which requires the cooperation of one’s enemy.  
According to Enright et al., “forgiveness is different from reconciliation” (2000, 
2).  Item R—“Treat your enemy with understanding, not provocation” seems 
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aimed at reconciliation as well, and addresses not the manner in which to 
respond to an injury, but rather focuses on forestalling any injury from occurring.  
Item J—“Do good for evil, not a bite for a bite” does address how one should 
respond to a hurt, but “doing good” may involve much more (or much less) than 
forgiveness.   
 Some of the sayings address forgiveness indirectly by promoting its 
opposite, revenge.  Question 4 states that “the saying may refer to either the 
presence or the absence of the ideas in boxes 1 and 2”.  Items T—“You’re a 
coward if you don’t take revenge”, U—“A gentleman takes revenge—ten years 
is not too late”, and V—“Forgiving others gives them the chance to make the 
same mistake again” promote an unforgiving attitude (in English, at any rate).  
Item V (chosen by 3% of respondents to be connected with Box 1) includes the 
character given as Item G in Question 3, which was identified with Box 1 by 
65% of respondents.  Apparently the vast majority of respondents 
misunderstood the “presence or absence” element of the question and focused 
their attention on items they felt promoted Box 1.  Of course, the justification for 
including these particular sayings in the first place is based upon the opposed 
natures of the English words “forgiveness” and “revenge”, and this justification 
may be absent in Mandarin. 
 While 58% of the respondents associate Item N with Box 1, Item P— 
“Forgiving a person isn’t foolish; it’s foolish not to forgive a person”, which  
includes the same characters for “forgiving a person” (饶人 –r2o r6n) used in 
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Item N (and not just once, but twice), is chosen by only 25% of the respondents.  
It is not clear why so many associate Item N but not Item P with Box 1. 
 The responses to Question 4 show that, of the eleven sayings most often 
associated with Enright’s definition of forgiveness given in Question 1, only two 
of those sayings deal with what Enright could consider forgiveness.  Of the two 
sayings most frequently suggested, one equates forgiveness with forgetting, 
while the other (along with three other synonymous sayings) is much more 
closely related to tolerance than to forgiveness.  Three of the other sayings aim 
at reconciliation, and one offers general advice on returning good for evil.   
 Question 5 is made up of 22 items from the MEFI, but respondents are 
not asked to respond to the items in the way that they would on the MEFI itself 
(i.e., rating their responses to someone who has hurt them).  Rather, they are 
asked to identify whether the feelings, actions, and thoughts described in the 
items, if directed to someone who has hurt them, would be indicative of what 
they suggest for Box 1 or Box 2.  All of the selected items are positive within 
their subscales, so the possible misunderstanding that appeared in Question 4 
about also selecting items that indicated a lack of the concepts presented in Box 
1 or Box 2 cannot occur in Question 5. 
 Almost all of the items are identified more with Box 1 than Box 2 
(although in 16 of the 22 items, the most frequent response is “neither”—see 
Figure 4.5), but again there appears to be no clearly discernible distinction 
between the two concepts defined in Questions 1 and 2.  Item M—“Regarding 
the person, I do or would do a favour” (37/PB) is associated with Box 1 by only  
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8% of the respondents, and with Box 2 by 15%.  The silent majority of 
respondents indicate no association with either box, but it is significant that for 
this item, more respondents see it as measuring Box 2 rather than Box 1.  Item 
T—“My attitude towards this person is that I think favourably of him/her” 
(56/PC) is identified with both boxes by 22% of the respondents, so this item is 
seen as equally indicative of one’s level of Box 1 or Box 2. 
 Of the 22 items, only four are indicated by 50% or more of the 
respondents as being indicative of Box 1: 
55% selected V—“My attitude towards this person is that I hope he/she 
 finds happiness” (60/PC) 
51% selected H—“Regarding the person, I do or would help” (25/PB) 
51% selected S—“My attitude towards this person is that I wish him/her 
 well” (54/PC) 
50% selected I—“Regarding the person, I am or would be considerate” 
 (28/PB) 
None of the affect subscale items are identified with Box 1 by more than 36% of 
the respondents.  These indicators within the affective component of the MEFI 
total score, therefore, are seen by about two-thirds of the respondents not to be 
connected with Enright’s definition of forgiveness.  While affective factors may 
not be completely absent from Box 1, they do not seem to be as important as 
the behavioural and cognitive factors, although even these factors are not 
identified with Box 1 to a great extent. 
 83
 The remaining 18 MEFI items in Question 5, then, are not identified by a 
majority of respondents as being connected to Enright’s definition of 
forgiveness. In fact, eleven of the items are selected by more than 50% of the 
respondents as having nothing to do with either Box 1 or Box 2.  Since the 
intention of Question 5 was to identify whether these MEFI items correspond 
with either Box 1 or Box 2, only those two options are available to respondents.  
Strictly speaking, a respondent cannot indicate that an item is not connected to 
either box, since no such option is available.  They can only not indicate that an 
item is connected to Box 1 or 2, which may or may not be the same thing.  
(While the directions for Question 3 explicitly state, “If the word has no 
connection to either Box 1 or Box 2, leave the line blank”, this is not stated in the 
directions for Question 5.)  More than 50% of the respondents do not indicate 
that these eleven MEFI items have any connection to either Box 1 or Box 2: 
D—“I feel tender toward him/her.”  (07/PA) 
E—“I feel caring toward him/her.”  (15/PA) 
F—“I feel affection toward him/her.”  (18/PA) 
J—“Regarding the person, I do or would reach out to him/her.” (30/PB) 
K—“Regarding the person, I do or would lend him/her a hand.” (32/PB) 
M—“Regarding the person, I do or would do a favour.” (37/PB) 
N—“Regarding the person, I do or would aid him/her when in trouble.” 
 (38/PB) 
P—“I think he or she is of good quality.” (44/PC) 
Q—“I think he or she is worthy of respect.” (45/PC) 
 84
R—“I think he or she is a good person.” (50/PC) 
T—“My attitude towards this person is that I think favourably of him/her.” 
 (56/PC) 
Considering the items by subscale, the proportions of items not identified with 
Box 1 (this list includes 3 of the 6 affect items, 4 of the 9 behaviour items, and 4 
of the 7 cognitive items) seem quite consistent across the subscales.   
 Question 6 asks respondents if Box 1 and Box 2 share the tripartite 
nature of Enright’s definition of forgiveness by asking if feelings, thoughts, and 
actions are or are not involved in their Box 1 and Box 2.  The affective 
component is most identified as being involved in both Box 1 (by 66.2% of 
respondents) and Box 2 (55.4%).  Box 1 involves behaviour a bit less (61.5%), 
and cognitive factors least of all (54.6%).  Box 2 involves behavioural and 
cognitive factors almost equally (52.3/51.5%).  
 It is in Question 7 that the word “forgiveness” appears for the first time in 
the questionnaire, although the topic of the questionnaire was revealed in the 
consent form (see Appendix E) that respondents read immediately before they 
were given the questionnaire.  The intent of this question is to determine 
whether respondents see “forgiveness” (whatever that English word may mean 
to them) and Box 1 as being spontaneous events or long-term processes.  A 
majority of respondents identify both forgiveness and Box 1 as processes 
(61.5%/58.5%).  A total of 23.1% see forgiveness as being both a spontaneous 
act and a process, while only 8.5% indicate that Box 1 shares this dual nature.  
Only 11.5% see forgiveness as being spontaneous, but Box 1 is seen as being 
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spontaneous by 26.2% of respondents.  This is yet another example of 
“forgiveness” and Box 1 not quite matching up. 
 Question 8 asks for responses to Enright’s implication in his definition 
that one has the right to resent those who unjustly injure one.  While 2.3% offer 
no response, and 1.5% reply “maybe”, 16.9% disagree, and 79.2% agree with 
Enright’s contention that resenting an unjust injury is justified. 
 Question 9 asks for responses to another of the implications in Enright’s 
definition: that someone who unjustly injures one does not deserve one’s 
compassion, generosity, and love.  While 10.8% reply “maybe”, and 6.2% offer 
no response, 26.9% agree with Enright’s implication, i.e., the injurer does not 
deserve the victim’s compassion, generosity, and love.  The majority of the 
respondents, 56.2%, disagree with Enright’s contention, suggesting that 
suffering an unjust injury does not absolve one from a responsibility to treat the 
injurer with compassion, generosity, and love.   
 The responses to Questions 8 and 9—suggesting that one has the right 
to resent unjust injury but must still show compassion, generosity, and love to 
the one resented—present an apparent contradiction.  Question 8 is concerned 
with feelings, however, while Question 9 deals with conduct.  Ho observes that 
in Chinese culture, “feelings are irrelevant; only proper conduct counts.  In such 
a world, out of necessity affect and role behaviour would be dissociated” (1987, 
242).  There is no contradiction between displaying proper conduct (i.e., acts of 
compassion, generosity, and love) toward someone one resents, because those 
feelings of resentment are, according to Ho, “irrelevant”.  While acts of 
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compassion, generosity, and love may be signs of forgiveness, such acts 
performed by one full of resentment cannot be said to meet Enright’s standard 
for forgiveness.  Again, the Western view of forgiveness and the Chinese view 
of Box 1 do not correspond. 
 
4.2 Summary and conclusions 
When asked to provide a Mandarin term to match Enright’s definition of 
forgiveness, respondents offered many possibilities.  While it has been 
suggested by Enright and his colleagues that “shu [i.e., 恕—sh* ] . . . is the 
principle word whose modern translation is forgiveness” (Enright, Eastin, 
Golden, Sarinopoulis, & Freedman, 1992, 86), this particular Mandarin character 
does not appear even once among the 33 suggestions for Box 1.  (It is offered 
twice in Question 2 as a synonym of “tolerance”, and ranks ninth in Question 3 
as being synonymous with forgiveness.  Chao (1998) defines it as 
“forbearance”, and Wei (2002, 1150) defines it this way: “① forbearance           
② forgive; pardon; excuse”.)  Not only is sh*  not “the principle word whose 
modern translation is forgiveness”, but according to this data it is unlikely that 
such a “principle word” even exists, unless a word like #23, suggested by 43.1% 
of this sample, qualifies as a “principle word”.  (In this case, #23 also ranks as 
the fourth most suggested term for “tolerance”.)   
 Data from Questions 1, 2, and 3 suggest that translating “forgiveness” 
and “tolerance” into Mandarin invites many overlaps and contradictions: the top 
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four suggestions for “forgiveness” and the top four suggestions for “tolerance” 
hold two words in common.  Of 16 suggested Mandarin terms, each of them is 
identified as 1) being synonymous with forgiveness; 2) being synonymous with 
tolerance; 3) being synonymous with both; and 4) being synonymous with 
neither; the word most identified as being synonymous with both is also most 
identified as being synonymous with neither; and the word most frequently 
identified in Question 3 as being synonymous with Box 1 appears in Question 1 
as a suggestion for Box 1 only twice (and as a suggestion for Box 2 once).  
Obviously, the English definitions given in both Questions 1 and 2 do not clearly 
define any Mandarin terms.  Just as there appears to be no “principle word” for 
“forgiveness”, there also appears to be little consensus regarding the translation 
of “tolerance”. 
 Of the Mandarin sayings listed in Question 4 that appear to be connected 
with the presence or absence of forgiveness, the eleven most frequently chosen 
sayings include only two (ranking second and fifth) that might correspond to 
Enright’s definition.  The other nine certainly do not, and the remaining two 
suggest that Box 1 is a good virtue that you should practice when (and this 
includes the implication of “if”) you can.  These two sayings are not specific 
enough to clearly identify with forgiveness.  The second-ranking saying is 
actually about tolerance according to Wei (2002, 700) and the other saying 
could refer to tolerance as well.  With their ancient history and virtually 
unparalleled literary tradition, Chinese seem to have very little to say about 
forgiveness as defined by Enright. 
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 With regard to the MEFI items in particular, only four of the 22 items in 
Question 5 are identified as being connected to Box 1 by 50% or more of the 
respondents (with 55% being the highest figure).  This compares to 11 items 
that are not identified by a majority of respondents as having a connection to 
either Box 1 or Box 2.  If the vast majority of items are not connected to Box 1, it 
is very possible that, whatever it is measuring, the MEFI is not measuring Box 1 
(i.e., Enright’s definition of forgiveness). 
 A majority of respondents agree with Enright that Box 1 involves 
affective, behavioural, and cognitive factors (in that order: 66.2%, 61.5%, and 
54.6%).  Box 2 was rated similarly, and the subscales appear in the same order, 
although the range is not as wide: 55.4%, 52.3%, and 51.5%. 
 Respondents are asked to compare the spontaneous/procedural aspects 
of forgiveness and Box 1 in Question 7.  While most respondents see both as 
processes (61.5% for forgiveness; 58.5% for Box 1), over a quarter of 
respondents identify Box 1 as spontaneous, compared to 11.5% who see 
forgiveness as spontaneous.  There is also a major difference in the number of 
respondents who see forgiveness and Box 1 as being “spontaneous processes” 
(23.1% and 8.5%).  It not clear how something can, in the words of Question 7, 
“happen quickly and suddenly” and also be “a longer process that begins at 
some time and ends at a later time”.  It is also not clear how or why forgiveness 
and Box 1 differ in their capacity to exhibit this dual nature. 
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 In his definition, Enright implies that one has the right to resent those who 
unjustly injure one.  It is here in Question 8 that the respondents exhibit their 
highest degree of agreement: 79.2% agree that yes, one does have that right. 
 In Question 9, the majority of respondents (56.2%) disagree with another 
of Enright’s implications—that a person who unjustly injures one does not 
deserve one’s compassion, generosity, and love.  This apparent severing of 
connections between feelings and conduct (since one should apparently show 
acts of compassion, generosity, and love to those one resents) suggests that 
one’s actions may have little bearing on one’s feelings (and vice-versa).  This 
calls into question the weighting of the subscales in the MEFI, since each 
subscale is weighted equally and contributes equally to the MEFI total score.  
Responses to Question 5 reveal that each MEFI item in the affect subscale is 
identified with Box 1 by no more than 36% of respondents.  Perhaps the 
expression of Box 1 depends upon conduct more than it does upon feelings.  In 
any case, the responses to Question 9 reveal that most respondents do not 
agree with a major implication of Enright’s definition, and it is upon this definition 
that the EFI and MEFI are based.   
 Of course, this set of data was collected using a questionnaire that 
exhibits shortcomings.  No statement was included to encourage students to 
respond to each item, and some may have misconstrued the section of the 
consent form that stated they “may choose not to answer some of the questions 
on the questionnaire”.  Also, it is possible (though highly unlikely) that native 
English speakers would also give a wide range of suggestions to fill in the 
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blanks in Questions 1 and 2.  That such data is unavailable is a shortcoming of 
this study, although it is certainly counter-intuitive that results from native 
English speakers would demonstrate as wide a range of contradictory 
suggestions as is seen here.  As mentioned above, in Question 3, a lack of 
response is explicitly defined as “no connection”.  In Questions 4 and 5, no such 
clarification is given.  While the intention of both questions was to determine if 
items were more closely connected to Box 1 or 2, they should not have been 
asked as “either/or” questions, with no options for indicating “both” or “neither”.  
The inclusion of sayings that discourage what seems to be forgiveness in 
Question 4 also produced puzzling results, and either they should not have 
been included or else the question should make it clearer that respondents 
should consider both positive and negative references to Boxes 1 and 2.  
Questions 3 through 5 could have included more items, but in the interests of 
both the researcher and the respondents did not.  Another limitation is that this 
questionnaire can only be administered to a small segment of China’s 
population. 
 This study is, of necessity, limited to Chinese with substantial knowledge 
of English.  Could it be adapted for use with Chinese respondents who are 
monolingual?  The English portions of the questionnaire would have to be 
translated, and it could perhaps be altered by providing definitions of 
“forgiveness” and “tolerance” in Questions 1 and 2, but the present results 
provide very little direction as to what those translations should be.  Chinese 
education students majoring in English obviously do not share Enright’s 
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conception of forgiveness—nor do they seem to share any consistent 
conception with one another.  If these “Westernized” (to some extent) Chinese 
respond to Enright’s definition with such a variety and diversity of often 
contradictory deviations, the MEFI (which is based upon the definition) will likely 
prompt similar responses.  Responses to the MEFI from Chinese students even 
less familiar with the West will likely reveal even more inexplicable results.  
 When faced with a data set such as this, one is tempted to dismiss it as 
nonsense.  How can one word, X, be, at the same time, a synonym of word Y, a 
synonym of word Z, a synonym of both, and a synonym of neither?  How can 
one word, when compared to two other words, be singled out from a group as 
being both the most synonymous and the most antonymous word of the group?  
In a case such as this, the researcher should remember the words of 
paleoanthropologist-turned-novelist Mary Doria Russell:  “Wisdom begins when 
you discover the difference between ‘That doesn’t make sense’ and ‘I don’t 
understand’” (1999, 170).  If the data seem to be inexplicable, accountability lies 
with the researcher, not the respondents—with the questions, not the answers. 
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Chapter Five 
THE MANDARIN ENRIGHT FORGIVENESS INVENTORY IN CHINA 
 Perhaps it should come as no surprise that the results of this research 
are perplexing.  The respondents are, after all, Chinese, “the most 
incomprehensible, unfathomable, inscrutable, contradictory and illogical people 
on earth” (according to early 20th-century American traveller Eliza Ruhamah 
Scidmore, cited in Scotland, 1993, 25).  Nor should it come as a surprise that 
forgiveness is apparently not clearly understood in China, 
. . . the land of topsy-turvydom, where a man shakes his own hand when 
he meets you. . .  wears white at a funeral, plays badminton with his feet, 
calls North-East East-North, rows a boat facing the wrong direction, 
mounts a horse from the wrong side, knits his socks from the toe 
upwards, [and] stacks his books in piles and not rows. (Scotland,  
1993, 166) 
 
 Nor should it be surprising that the racist and ethnocentric attitudes reflected in 
comments like these, made at the beginning and end of the 20th century, affect 
people’s thinking in the 21st.  (Chinese writers make similar comments.  No less 
a philosopher than Confucius himself believed that “fastening clothes on the 
wrong (or left) side, was natural to the barbarian tribes in general” (cited in 
Spence, 2001, 168), and there is some truth to Hong Kong-based Larry Feign’s 
snide observation that “according to local opinion surveys, Chinese people 
believe that only Caucasians are capable of being racist” (2002).  Gries offers 
the example of “the notion that Asians can understand Shakespeare, but that 
 93
only Asians—not Westerners—can appreciate the Tang poetry of Tu Fu”—
2004, 154.)  Within the context of intercultural encounters, examples of cultural 
diversity often provoke suspicion and condemnation rather than appreciation 
and celebration.  My questionnaire is yet another intercultural encounter 
between a Western instrument and Chinese respondents.  The contradictory, 
nonsensical results of this research are not due to some quirk of the Asian 
personality, but to the primary subject matter of the questionnaire: Enright’s 
definition of forgiveness, a Western construct that does not seem to translate 
well into Chinese, neither linguistically, philosophically, practically, nor 
theoretically.  This, of course, has great bearing upon the validity of the MEFI. 
 One of Pargament, McCullough, and Thoreson’s “critical questions for 
research on forgiveness” is this: “To what extent do members of different 
cultural, religious, and ethnic groups define forgiveness in different ways?” 
(2000, 313).  My research suggests that Chinese themselves define forgiveness 
in different ways—in a wide variety of often contradictory ways.  In another 
article, McCullough, Pargament, and Thoreson predict serious consequences if 
forgiveness researchers continue to ignore the effects of religion, culture, and 
experience upon people’s understandings of forgiveness: “Without addressing 
religious, cultural, and situational variations, scientific notions of forgiveness are 
likely to be disconnected from lived human experience” (2000, 10).  Their words, 
“lived human experience”, echo Edmund Carpenter’s “life energy” in his more 
harshly stated charges against those he sometimes labels “misanthropologists”: 
Clothing themselves in liberal platitudes and employing what they called 
“scientific methodologies,” anthropologists translated other cultures into 
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unreadable jargon and statistics, almost none of it translatable back into 
life energy. . . .  Every category came from the dominant culture. The 
indigenous culture wasn’t preserved and presented: it was swallowed. 
(1976, 188-191—italics added) 
 
LeBaron, for example, found that Western writing about conflict generally 
. . . reflects many culturally-rooted biases: it tends to be action-oriented 
and assume autonomous individual actors.  It tends to privilege intellect 
and treat emotions as something to be managed and contained.  
Collectivist notions of hierarchy, face-saving and lasting links to a place 
and community go largely unaddressed.  Culture itself is often not dealt 
with or oversimplified. (2001, 10) 
 
The MEFI is undeniably scientific in form—it is advertised by its distributor as 
“an objective tool for forgiveness research” (Mind Garden, Inc., 2004), and 
seems to meet the needs of North American psychology, “with its strong 
preference for quantification and universalism” (Greenfield, 1997, 1115).  Its 
orientation, however, is clearly one of cultural deficiency, and this effort of the 
International Forgiveness Institute may contribute less to the globalization of 
forgiveness research than to its “gobblelization”—Fernandez’s term for what 
results when one does not experience “the decentering of one’s worldview, the 
reconfiguring of power relations, and the pluralizing of one’s world” (1997, 104).  
In a multi-author examination of religious perspectives on forgiveness Hallisey, 
an expert on Buddhism, suggests that, taken together, compassion and 
forbearance “may approximate the notion of forgiveness” (Rye et al., 2000, 23—
italics added).  In their conclusion, Rye and Pargament summarize and 
overstate Hallisey’s comments on Buddhism: “Forgiveness is subsumed by the 
concepts of forbearance and compassion” (2000, 37).  Not only is the caution of 
McCullough, Pargament, and Thoreson left unheeded, but the hesitation and 
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doubt of their own expert is ignored, and Rye and Pargament’s conclusion is 
that Buddhist forbearance and compassion and Christian forgiveness are the 
same.  Such a conclusion is unwarranted.  
 Enright makes it clear that forgiveness is a Judeo-Christian construct: 
“The two ancient systems with perhaps the most well-developed ideas on 
interpersonal forgiveness per se are the Hebrew and Christian approaches” and 
“although interpersonal forgiveness is discussed in [Confucianism and Islam]. . . 
they do not contain as many expositions as Jewish and Christian writing, nor are 
the subtleties and nuances as evident” (Enright, Eastin, Golden, Sarinopoulis, & 
Freedman, 1992, 86; Enright, Gassin, & Wu, 1992, 100).  Govier makes a more 
subtle and more nuanced distinction: “There is a stronger emphasis on 
forgiveness and a greater stress on unconditional forgiveness in Christianity 
than in Judaism. . . .  It is within the Christian tradition that forgiveness is most 
emphasized” (2002, 101 and 158).  Hannah Arendt considers forgiveness to be 
“one of the two most original ideas in Western civilization” (cited in Rowe, et al., 
1989, 233—italics added).  When the EFI is administered to respondents from 
traditions where forgiveness is less emphasized (i.e., any non-Christian 
tradition), EFI final scores will likely be lower.  This is significant when the EFI is 
used in Asia, since “the basic Buddhist and Hindu cosmology, shared by about 
one-fifth of the world’s population. . . has no formal place for human repentance 
and divine forgiveness” (Elder, 1998, 158).  My research reveals that Chinese 
students in particular respond to Enright’s definition of forgiveness in a wide 
variety of ways. 
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 One of the results of the cultural deficiency approach (i.e., using one’s 
own culture as the standard, and examining how other cultures are not as good 
as one’s own) is that the other culture inevitably fails to measure up.  No culture 
is as “Chinese” as Chinese culture, and no culture is as “Western” as Western 
culture.  Another result of this focus on how other cultures fail to measure up to 
our standard is that it not only hinders an appreciation of areas in which cultures 
differ (and with this mindset, difference = deficiency), but also offers no 
motivation to try to understand and appreciate these differences.  While Sax 
claims that “the recognition of difference does not always or necessarily involve 
an inferiorization of the Other” (1998, 294—italics added), the fact that he finds it 
necessary to point this out suggests that such recognition routinely does involve 
inferiorization. 
 This attitude was displayed by 17th-century Western artists’ responses to 
Chinese art: “Many Westerners assumed that Chinese painters had no grasp of 
Western realistic painting techniques, for if they had, they would have used 
them” (McIntyre, 1996).  Chinese artists had actually, by that time, been 
employing realistic painting techniques for centuries.  What had not occurred to 
these early Western art critics was that Chinese artists did have a grasp of 
realistic techniques and had deliberately chosen not to employ them.  Most 
Chinese painters did not paint in a realistic style, but this was not the result of 
ignorance or lack of ability, but the result of a conscious decision.  They thought 
that “Realistic techniques were merely methods of creating an optical illusion.  
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They felt that Western painting missed the point: that the true reality of things 
lies behind the illusion of outward appearances” (McIntyre, 1996). 
 When studying “forgiveness per se” (i.e., Christian forgiveness) in other 
cultures, many Westerners may dismiss any discovered differences in the 
manner of those early art critics and assume that Chinese have no grasp of 
Christian forgiveness, for if they had, they would employ it.  This analogy cannot 
be carried too far, of course, because there is no evidence at all to suggest that 
Christianity in general and Christian forgiveness in particular have ever been 
tried and found wanting in the same way that realistic painting techniques were, 
but collectivist Chinese may in some ways feel that Western forgiveness, like 
Western realistic art theory, misses the point.  
 “Missing the point” is one of the dangers associated with applying an 
existing instrument in another culture.  In many ways, existing instruments 
exported to other cultures function as what Eco terms “background books”: 
We (in the sense of human beings) travel and explore the world, carrying 
with us some “background books”.  These need not accompany us 
physically; the point is that we travel with preconceived notions of the 
world, derived from our cultural tradition.  In a very curious sense, we 
travel knowing in advance what we are on the verge of discovering, 
because past reading has told us what we are supposed to discover.  In 
other words, the influence of these background books is such that, 
irrespective of what travelers discover and see, they will interpret and 
explain everything in terms of these books. (1998, 71)  
 
Brislin warns that these existing instruments may miss culture-specific aspects 
of the phenomenon in question, and that researchers may impose conclusions 
based upon their own cultural concepts that may be foreign or to some extent 
incorrect when used in another culture.  He also points out that an existing 
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instrument, of necessity, provides operational definitions of certain concepts: 
“There is no guarantee that those concepts, or those same operational 
definitions, exist in other cultures” (1986, 138-139).  Those who impose existing 
instruments upon those of other cultures are often simultaneously “imposing an 
etic” (i.e., believing “that one’s own etic-emic combination is true for all cultures. 
. . . [and] believing that one’s cultural emics are part of the culturally common 
etic”—Brislin, 2000, 85).  Examining other cultures from the perspective of an 
existing instrument guarantees that researchers will either find or fail to find 
what they are looking for, but it also guarantees that they will almost certainly 
never discover something they are not looking for.  Margaret Mead makes the 
general claim that  
One of the principle contributions of anthropology should be to distil from 
our available treasure house of small and unusual social models—many 
of them outside the single narrow and steadily converging mainstream of 
“civilization”—new combinations and new forms that will release us from 
our historically [and culturally] limited imaginations. (1967, 225) 
 
More specifically, “different perspectives on forgiveness can help social 
scientists to appreciate the richness and diversity of conceptualizations that 
exist rather than mistakenly characterizing forgiveness as a monolithic 
construct” (Rye et al., 2000, 18).  Intercultural researchers must make a 
conscious effort to disprove the Chinese proverb, “Two-thirds of what a person 
sees exists behind that person’s eyes” (Sodowsky and Johnson, 1994).  In the 
case of the MEFI, where only 18% of the selected MEFI items were identified by 
a (slim) majority of respondents as actually being indicative of forgiveness, 
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much of what the MEFI (supposedly) reveals about forgiveness in China must, 
of necessity, exist behind the Western researcher’s eyes. 
 Of course, what appears in front of a person’s eyes is also significant, 
and in the area of forgiveness in literature, Chinese and Western literature vary 
significantly.  Professor (and poet) Nadya Aisenberg has written of the social 
implications of forgiveness in the literature of Aeschylus, George Eliot, William 
Shakespeare, Charles Dickens, Joseph Conrad, and Henry James (Poetry 
Porch, 2004), and the list could be greatly expanded beyond these luminaries.  
James Fenimore Cooper, for instance, offers this analysis regarding cultural 
variations of forgiveness in Hawkeye’s comments to an Indian dying from a 
wound inflicted by Hawkeye: “You were treacherous, according to your natur’, 
and I was a little oversightful, as I’m apt to be in trusting others” (1963, 116).  As 
King summarizes Hawkeye’s philosophy as presented throughout this passage, 
“Revenge is an Indian gift and forgiveness is a White gift” (2003, 104).  Western 
viewers often receive lessons in forgiveness while watching television programs 
and films.  For example, Buffy, the vampire slayer and Angels in America 
present these forgiveness insights: “To forgive is an act of compassion, Buffy.  
It’s not done because people deserve it.  It’s done because they need it”, and, “It 
isn’t easy.  It doesn’t count if it’s easy.  It’s the hardest thing.  Forgiveness.  
Maybe that’s where love and justice finally meet” (Whedon, 1997; Kushner, 
2003).  Brandauer’s analysis, in contrast, finds that “an emphasis on forgiveness 
is rare in Chinese literature.  The normal emphasis is, instead, on. . . reciprocity.  
And the negative aspect of reciprocity is, of course, revenge” (1993, 421).  
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While this emphasis on revenge may seem out of place in a culture holding 
tolerance as one of its highest virtues, tolerance, regrettably, may not be 
amenable to riveting literature.  The Western tradition, admittedly, certainly lacks 
no shortage of revenge tales, but stories of forgiveness are far from rare.  In 
addition to listening and speaking courses taught by Western teachers, the 
respondents to my questionnaire have completed year-long courses in both 
British and American literature, and have watched Western films, both in formal 
classroom settings and extracurricularly.  It is highly likely that they have come 
across examples of Western forgiveness in these classes.  Were my 
questionnaire to be administered to non-English major students (who have not 
had most of these experiences), their responses would almost certainly be even 
more perplexing. 
 Enright and Fitzgibbons address the issue of cultural differences in the 
development of forgiveness, but they do so in a frustratingly ambiguous manner:  
“We doubt the progression is universal if we eventually find differences across 
cultures regarding people’s understanding of forgiveness” (2000, 54).  While it is 
impossible to determine their precise meaning, the “if” seems to suggest that 
their chosen approach is to take universality for granted until some future point 
at which they may “eventually” uncover some cultural differences.  They 
anticipate that “if certain cultures have a generally similar understanding of 
forgiveness as in the United States (where the initial validation studies 
occurred), then we would expect general parallelism in the developmental 
progression across the cultures” (2000, 54).  No mention is made of those 
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cultures which do not have a generally similar understanding, but they would 
probably not expect general parallelism, and, as a result, they would probably 
not expect comparable EFI total scores.  They do, in fact, acknowledge that “the 
expression of forgiveness will vary by culture and religion. . . .  There is no one 
specific way to express forgiveness to another, although certain cultures have 
rituals that are specific and idiosyncratic” (2000, 35).  Again, an exception is 
made for “certain cultures”, and again, the question arises: what will the EFI 
measure in those cultures?  They strongly understate the potential for cultural 
differences when they suggest that “the Confucian idea of community harmony 
and tolerance may produce different responses than in the United States, where 
issues of justice and righting individual wrongs may be stronger” (2000, 281).  In 
fact, emphases on harmony and tolerance notwithstanding, “the Confucian 
tradition had little warrant for forgiving serious injury out of mercy, and the 
Communist Party continued this tradition” (Madsen, 1990, 190), and the 
implication that Chinese may have a relatively weaker sense of justice is 
addressed (indirectly) by the response of Ohbuchi et al. to Western researchers’ 
charges that there is no sense of fairness in Japanese culture:   
Justice is a complex or multidimensional concept, but in individualistic 
cultures, it tends to be equated to fairness. . . .  In Japan, however, 
fairness in an exchange of resources may not be as important as. . . 
other social values, such as protection of social organizations or 
maintenance of interpersonal relationships. (1999, 53) 
 
In their discussion of the EFI in particular, Enright and Fitzgibbons suggest that  
 
Forgiveness possesses certain features common to a wide variety of 
cultures. . . .  at least in the cultures chosen.  We doubt that forgiveness 
is a convention, subject to such deep and divergent cultural 
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interpretations, as to render the concept unrecognizable when taken out 
of one cultural context and placed in another. (2000, 312) 
 
Again, qualifications appear which effectively nullify any claim to universality, 
and to suggest that a concept is not rendered absolutely unrecognizable when 
placed in another culture is far from a claim of universality.  The claim itself is 
questionable, since most Westerners, for example, would fail to recognize the 
African forgiveness rituals described in Chapter Three as having any connection 
to forgiveness. 
 Forgiveness varies not only across cultures, but also within cultures.  
McCullough and Worthington raised the question (mentioned at the end of 
Chapter Two) of distinguishing between the content and the consequences of 
forgiveness, a question directed at Enright and his definition of forgiveness.  
(McCullough and Worthington have differed with Enright before, with Enright 
claiming that their conceptualization of forgiveness is “incomplete”—Enright, 
1999, 218.)  They also question the validity of the one-sided, therapeutic 
forgiveness (i.e., forgiveness that is beneficial to the victim alone—McKnight, 
2004, 36) defined by Enright: 
Forgiveness does not occur exclusively in the context of a single soul: 
forgiveness involves two or more souls.  While forgiveness may produce 
individual healing, forgiveness is designed to heal souls and community. . 
. . [We should] remove forgiveness from the realm of individual health 
and place it in the service of human relationships, showing that we are 
connected to one another, for better or for worse.  (McCullough, 
Sandage, & Worthington, 1995, 362) 
 
Ranley concurs: “Forgiveness is a psychological construct as well as a social 
one. . . .  It is important to be aware of both elements, though . . . some writers 
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focus more on one element than the other” (2004, 16).  Augsburger accounts for 
these differing emphases in cultural terms:   
In a Western, individualist culture, unilateral “forgiveness” becomes the 
norm. . . .  In more collective cultures. . . the understanding of forgiveness 
is that it is not a private act of intrapsychic release but instead a truly 
social transaction of interpersonal reconciliation.  (1996, 14) 
 
With regard to the EFI in particular, Augsburger claims, “The EFI actually 
measures the ability to restore an attitude of acceptance, not the transaction of 
forgiveness that is ‘the mutual recognition that repentance is genuine and right 
relationships are restored’” (personal communication via e-mail, October 29, 
2002).  In his view, not only does the EFI fall short, but so too does Enright’s 
definition: it is “minimal” (personal communication via e-mail, January 14, 2003).  
Ho’s comments on “face” seem to apply to forgiveness as well: “The Western 
mentality, deeply ingrained with the values of individualism, is not one which is 
favourably disposed to the idea of face.  For face is never a purely individual 
thing” (1976, 882).  As mentioned above, examples of forgiveness in the West 
are often notable because they are the exception, rather than the rule, and only 
self-forgiveness is “a purely individual thing”.  While the EFI intends to gauge 
one person’s response to another, as Elder notes, “where collectivities are 
involved, the issue of forgiveness becomes much more complicated than in the 
one-to-one model of an injured person and a wrongdoer” (1998, 161).  It is not 
only forgiveness “experts” who recognize the relational nature of forgiveness.  In 
his poem, The star-splitter, Robert Frost writes, “If one by one we counted 
people out/ For the least sin, it wouldn’t take us long/ To get so we had no one 
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left to live with./ For to be social is to be forgiving” (1979, 177).  To be social is 
to be forgiving—just as “being social” is culturally determined, so too is forgiving. 
 Attitudes regarding individualism are also culturally determined, and as 
noted in 3.2.2, Chinese use the term in the derogatory sense of being inhuman 
and selfish.  In a culture where tolerance is the highest virtue, the doctrine of 
individualism is a frightening one.  If one is only concerned for oneself, there is 
little reason to be tolerant of others and every reason to hope that one will be 
forgiven by others when necessary.  One American teacher in China was told by 
his student that when the student and his roommate talk late into the night while 
their four roommates are sleeping (or trying to sleep), they make no effort to 
lower their voices, since the implication would be that their roommates may not 
be able to tolerate their talking (personal communication in conversation, M. 
Wiggs, 2003).  Apparently the late-night talkers felt their roommates would lose 
more sleep at the thought of being considered intolerant than they would by the 
loud gossip.  (This notion is somewhat similar to the Chinese tradition of not 
saying “谢谢” (xi8 xie—“thank you”) to family members or close friends for small 
or large courtesies—to do so would be to denigrate the close relationship, since 
one thanks only those within a relationship so distant that one would not expect 
such courtesy.  Saying “thanks” indicates distance, not closeness, between the 
one who offers it and the one who receives it.) 
 These commonplace practices in China may seem paradoxical to 
Westerners who are generally more courteous to those close to them than to 
those in more distant relationships.  One should not show courtesy to one’s 
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close friends because it might imply that they are intolerant?  One should not 
thank those who are close to one because it would indicate a lack of closeness?  
Perhaps another seeming paradox exists in China: one should not offer 
forgiveness because it would indicate one’s lack of tolerance.  As Augsburger 
notes, “Tolerating and forgiving are different processes.  We tolerate what 
another has done when we overlook or ignore.  We forgive what we cannot 
tolerate, will not overlook or ignore” (1996, 165).  If we forgive what we cannot 
tolerate in a culture where tolerance is a virtue, then forgiveness displays a lack 
of virtue, and the question arises: which is the more highly valued virtue, 
tolerance or forgiveness?  Is the one who forgives judged positively for having 
forgiven, or judged negatively for not being tolerant?  According to Augsburger’s 
distinction, saying “I forgive you” is equivalent to admitting, “I cannot tolerate 
what you have done”.  For example, were the sleepy roommates mentioned 
above to forgive their chatty roommates for being so noisy, would the 
beneficiaries of the forgiveness respond with gratitude or anger?  In question 9 
of the questionnaire, the majority or respondents disagreed with Enright’s 
contention that, in this particular case, the late-night gossipers would not 
deserve their roommates’ compassion, generosity, and love.  Could it be that 
the tired roommates would not forgive their noisy roommates precisely because 
they still feel obliged to treat them with compassion, generosity, and love, and 
that to offer forgiveness would suggest that the noisy pair’s actions were 
intolerable?  In a culture where one does not thank those close to one, and 
where one may make no effort to minimize an irritation for fear that others will 
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interpret that as an implicit criticism, offering forgiveness may be interpreted not 
as the action of a virtuous person but rather as the action of an intolerant one. 
 While tolerance is a virtue in China, in the West, tolerance has limits, as 
is pointed out by the British orator and statesman, Edmund Burke: “There is a 
limit at which forbearance ceases to be a virtue” (1769, 273).  For some 
Christians, it is not a virtue, but a sin.  According to theologian (and mystery 
writer) Dorothy L. Sayers,  
In the world it is called tolerance, but in hell it is called despair. . . the sin 
that believes in nothing, interferes with nothing, enjoys nothing, hates 
nothing, finds purpose in nothing, lives for nothing, and remains alive 
because there is nothing for which it will die. (cited in Callaway, 2003, 9) 
 
It is possible that Chinese “tolerance” (a virtue) and Western “tolerance” (a sin) 
are two different things.  The seven “nothings” of Sayers’ definition imply that 
there is, indeed, “something” to believe in, interfere with, enjoy, hate, find 
purpose in, live for, and die for.  Chinese, of course, along with those of other 
cultures, also have things to believe in, interfere with, enjoy, hate, find purpose 
in, live for, and die for, but these things and Sayers’ things are not the same, 
and are dismissed by Sayers as “nothing”.  A more “tolerant” approach is found 
in the words of contemporary theologian Brian McLaren:  “Tolerance” is “a dirty 
word for many Christians. . . .  But it is a beautiful word. . . if you are trying to 
live in community with others” (2004, 211). 
 While it is not obvious how many of those involved in forgiveness 
research are Christians, many forgiveness scholars have published articles in 
explicitly Christian publications (e.g., Enright, 1990; Gassin, 2001; McCullough, 
Sandage, & Worthington, 1995; Witvliet, 2001), and “we should not forget that 
 107
forgiveness is theological” (McKnight, 2004, 36).  When adherents are 
encouraged to pray, “forgive us our debts, as we also have forgiven our debtors” 
(Holy Bible, Matthew 6: 12), they are given both a rationale and an 
encouragement to forgive.  As Rye et al. note, “In theistic religions, forgiveness 
becomes a means of imitating God, carrying out God’s plan, or enhancing one’s 
relationship with the divine” (2000, 17).  A characteristic of divinity, forgiveness 
is seen as a necessity for humanity.  Meek and McMinn point out, “A Christian 
understanding of forgiveness begins with a recognition of the depravity inherent 
in humanity. . . .  Christians view sin as an inseparable part of the current 
human condition” (1997, 52).  Where there is sin, there must, of necessity, be 
forgiveness.   
 Chinese, in contrast, “generally believe that man is basically good and 
perfectible. . . .  They therefore feel little need to be saved from [or forgiven for, 
perhaps?] anything” (Anonymous, 2001, 51-52).  Indeed, world religions with no 
concept of an offended, holy God (including some Native American religions, 
along with Buddhism, Taoism, and Hinduism) make little mention of forgiveness.  
As Enright points out, “when the emphasis is on being one with the whole, 
individual offense is often interpreted as caused by ignorance not sin. If 
everyone has the essential nature of a supreme being, personal forgiveness 
becomes unnecessary” (Enright & the Human Development Study Group, 1991, 
126).  Indeed, according to Buddhist teaching, “the thought that one person can 
‘forgive’ another reflects ignorance” (Elder, 1998, 159).  While only a small 
percentage of Chinese would actually consider themselves Buddhists, Buddhist 
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thought has had, and continues to have, a profound effect upon Chinese 
culture.  As a nontheistic religion, Buddhism has no “theology” per se, and it 
“doesn’t have a word for forgiveness per se” (Fernandez, 2001).  With its 
emphasis on the interconnectedness of all things, “the very notion of an ‘enemy’ 
needing to be forgiven is foreign to Buddhism” (Higgins, 2001, 9).  Since time is 
suspended in Buddhism (as it is in some forms of Taoism), “the question of 
forgiveness isn’t asked, since there is no judgement” (Kristeva, 2002, 285).  
While acknowledging that a spirit of forgiveness is not incompatible with 
Buddhist teachings, Govier concludes that “strictly speaking, human 
punishment, and reward, and forgiveness, would seem to have no place in this 
[Buddhist] picture of the world” (2002, 162).  One questionnaire respondent 
gives a very Buddhist response to question 9, which asks if a person who hurts 
one deserves one’s compassion, generosity, and love: 
A purposeful offense from others usually indicates a misunderstanding 
between the offender and the offended, and a lack of communication 
between them which I believe can only be dealt with through more 
efficient communication, which requires the establishment of a sound 
interpersonal relationship. 
 
Something akin to forgiveness would be necessary for “the establishment of a 
sound interpersonal relationship”, but it is far from certain that this necessary 
step is Christian forgiveness.  
 The questionnaire results raise many questions, but according to the 
respondents, the answer to the question, “Does the MEFI measure 
forgiveness?”, is no, it measures neither forgiveness as defined by Enright in 
English, nor forgiveness as translated by Enright into Mandarin.  The results 
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offer little direction as to what it does measure, although tolerance seems to be 
involved.  A study that examined both forgiveness and tolerance in the West 
and China would be illuminating.  As mentioned above, it would also be helpful 
to ask Western respondents questions one and two of the questionnaire, to see 
how widely the resulting answers vary.  Presumably the majority of respondents 
would answer “forgiveness” and “tolerance”, but there might be other 
suggestions as well.  The questionnaire needs improvements and additions, as 
noted in 4.2.  This improved questionnaire could perhaps be replicated in other 
cultures that have been or will be able to utilize the EFI in their own language.  
According to the director of the International Forgiveness Institute, the firm that 
has distributed the EFI since 2004, Mind Garden, Inc., is currently preparing to 
distribute versions in Korean, German, Dutch, and Norwegian, along with the 
Mandarin version (M. T. Mead, personal communication via e-mail, October 14, 
2004).  Parts 3 and 4 of this questionnaire could not simply be translated into 
the target language—local synonyms and sayings that seem connected to 
forgiveness would have to be collected in the appropriate language.  
Presumably, such a study carried out in one of the European countries would 
reveal a more consistent view of forgiveness due to those countries’ Christian 
influences.  A Korean study would perhaps reveal a less consistent and more 
perplexing view, similar to the results of this study.  In the case of the EFI (and 
other inventories which deal with both internal and external factors), 
consideration should also be given to the effects of administering the inventory 
in cultures where thinking/feeling one way and acting in another is not 
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condemned as hypocrisy but recognized as a social necessity.  Certainly, 
preliminary research of some kind should be carried out before the EFI is 
administered in these other cultures.  This would be in the best interests of 
intercultural research in general and forgiveness research in particular.  For 
intercultural research to be valid, “it is necessary to research the meaning or 
meanings that participants in the new culture attach to the instrument and to its 
procedure. . . when a given instrument is used beyond the culture in which it 
was developed” (Greenfield, 1997, 1122).  As Enright and the Human 
Development Study Group point out, forgiveness “is idiosyncratic for each of us” 
(1991, 148).  If forgiveness varies from individual to individual, certainly it will 
vary from culture to culture.  By definition, intercultural research entails 
intercultural communication.  Scollon and Scollon observe that effective 
intercultural communication “requires study of cultural and discourse differences 
on the one hand, but also requires a recognition of one’s own limitations”  
(1995, 15). 
  Those whose view of forgiveness is informed by Christian theology may 
not be aware that theology also informs intercultural research.  Some Christians 
certainly seem less willing to accept biblical instruction in this latter area.  While 
the Bible offers many insights into forgiveness, it also indicates that all people 
(i.e., people in every culture) are formed in God’s image.  Christian groups that 
list “multiculturalism” along with “pressure to drink, have premarital sex, and 
experiment with drugs” as dangers faced by college students (Watters, 1998, 4) 
seem content to worship a monocultural god.  Although this does not deter them 
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from proselytizing those of other cultures to accept “their” god, Western culture 
sets the standard for knowledge of the divine no more than it sets the standard 
for forgiveness.  As Taiwanese theologian C. S. Song observes, “we have 
tailored God to suit our limited imagination and created an image of God that 
strongly reflects our cultural biases” (1996, 34).  The EFI (and the MEFI) reflect 
a tailored, culturally-biased image of forgiveness.   
 Responses to the MEFI, then, are very similar to the ancient letter from 
Ying; the resulting MEFI total scores are explanations from Yan.  While the 
archetypal letter promoted “holding the candle high” and the resulting 
misunderstanding led to prosperity, MEFI responses will provide little 
illumination, and MEFI total scores will not lead to a clearer understanding of 
“forgiveness” in China. 
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Appendix A:  The questionnaire 
 
1. What Mandarin Chinese word (in 汉字) would best fill in the box in the 
following definition?  Write your answer in Box 1: 
 
       Box 1 
                                  is a willingness to abandon one’s right to resentment, 
 negative judgement, and indifferent behaviour toward one who unjustly 
 injured us, while fostering the undeserved qualities of compassion, 
 generosity and even love toward him or her.   
 
2. What Mandarin Chinese word (in 汉字) would best fill in the box in the 
following definition?  Write your answer in Box 2: 
 
                 Box 2 
 
                                  is a willingness to allow behavior of which one does not  
approve, even though one has the authority to stop the behavior. 
 
 
3. Write your answer to question 1 in Box 1 at the top of the next page.   
 
      Write your answer to question 2 in Box 2 at the top of the next page. 
 
      Consider the following words, A to P, and for each word do the following: 
 
• place a “3” on the line underneath Box 1 if the meaning is 
the same as the word you wrote in Box 1 
 
• or place a “3” on the line underneath Box 2 if the meaning 
is the same as the word you wrote in Box 2.   
 
• or place a “3” on the line in the middle if the meaning is 
somewhere in between.   
 
• If the word has no connection to either Box 1 or Box 2, 
leave the line blank. 
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           Box 1              Box 2 
 
   
 
A  耐性 _____      _____      _____ 
B  饶  _____      _____      _____ 
C  接 受 _____      _____      _____ 
D  见谅 _____      _____      _____ 
E  忍受 _____      _____      _____ 
F  恕罪 _____      _____      _____ 
G  原谅 _____      _____      _____ 
H  谅  _____      _____      _____ 
I  宽恕 _____      _____      _____ 
J  恕    _____      _____      _____ 
K  宽容   _____      _____      _____ 
L  容忍 _____      _____      _____ 
M  容纳 _____      _____      _____ 
N  饶恕 _____      _____      _____ 
O  包容   _____      _____      _____ 
P  大度   _____      _____      _____ 
 
4. Again, write your answer to question 1 in Box 1, and your answer to 
question 2 in Box 2.  For each of the following sayings, indicate if the 
saying is more closely connected to the word in Box 1 or Box 2 by 
placing a “3” on the appropriate line.  The saying may refer to either the 
presence or the absence of the ideas in Boxes 1 and 2.  If there is no 
connection to either Box 1 or 2, leave the line blank. 
 
                                                                                         Box 1           Box 2 
 
 
 
A  海纳百川有容乃大   _____      _____ 
B  宰相肚里能撑船    _____      _____ 
C  大人有大量     _____      _____ 
D  化干戈为玉帛    _____      _____ 
E  化敌为友     _____      _____ 
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F  夫妻没有隔夜仇    _____      _____ 
G  虚怀若谷     _____      _____ 
H  两败俱伤     _____      _____ 
I  怨恨在心快乐无缘    _____      _____ 
J  以德报怨不要以牙还牙   _____      _____ 
K  忍不能忍之而忍    _____      _____ 
L  宽容是一种美德    _____      _____ 
M  孰可忍孰不可忍    _____      _____ 
N  得饶人处且饶人    _____      _____ 
O  和气生财     _____      _____ 
P  饶人不是痴汉痴汉不饶人  _____      _____ 
Q  不计前嫌     _____      _____ 
R  冤家宜解不宜结    _____      _____ 
S  对敌人的仁慈就是对自己的残忍 _____      _____ 
T  此仇不报非君子    _____      _____ 
U  君子报仇十年不晚   _____      _____ 
V  原谅别人等于默许他下次   
      犯同样的错误    _____      _____ 
W  唾面自干     _____      _____ 
X  忍是心头一把刀忍字头上一把刀 _____      _____ 
Y  是可忍孰不可忍    _____      _____ 
Z  比陆地大的是海洋     
比海洋大的是天空 
比天空更大的则是人的胸怀  _____      _____ 
 
 
5. If you say the following statements about someone who has hurt you 
unjustly, are you showing what is described in Box 1 or Box 2 from 
above?  Place a “3” on the appropriate line.  If there is no connection to 
either Box 1 or 2, leave the line blank.    Box 1            Box 2 
 
  
 
 A  我对他/她的感觉是温暖的。  _____      _____ 
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B  我对他/她的感觉是好心的。  _____      _____ 
 
C  我对他/她的感觉是正向的。  _____      _____ 
 
D  我对他/她的感觉是温柔的。  _____      _____ 
 
E  我对他/她的感觉是在乎。  _____      _____ 
 
F  我对他/她的感觉是热情。  _____      _____ 
 
G  对这个人，我现在会或将来 
会表示尊重。    _____      _____ 
 
H  对这个人，我现在会或将来会 
当他有困难时，帮助他。  _____      _____ 
 
 
I  对这个人，我现在会或将来会 
体谅他。     _____      _____ 
 
J  对这个人，我现在会或将来会 
当他有困难时，刻意帮他 
一个大忙。    _____      _____ 
 
K  对这个人，我现在会或将来会 
当他有困难时，看他可怜， 
帮他个忙。    _____      _____ 
 
L  对这个人，我现在会或将来会 
和他建立良好关系。  _____      _____ 
 
M  对这个人，我现在会或将来会 
当他有困难时，只帮他举手 
之劳的小忙。    _____      _____ 
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N  对这个人，我现在会或将来会 
借钱给他，资助他。  _____      _____ 
 
O  对这个人，我现在会或将来会 
参加他的聚会或活动。  _____      _____ 
 
P  我认为他/她是优质的。  _____      _____ 
 
Q  我认为他/她是值得尊敬的。  _____      _____ 
   
R  我认为他/她是一个好人。  _____      _____ 
 
S  对于这个人，我祝他幸福。  _____      _____ 
 
T  对于这个人，我认为他是一个 
不错的人。    _____      _____ 
 
U  对于这个人，我希望他成功。 _____      _____ 
 
V  对于这个人，我希望他找到幸福。_____      _____ 
 
 
6. Do the words you wrote in boxes 1 and 2 involve how you feel about the 
person who hurt you, and what you think about that person, and how you 
act towards that person, or do they involve only a few, or none of those 
things?  Underline “does” or “does not” to show your answer. 
 
        does/does not involve how I feel about the person who hurt me. 
   Box 1    
                does/does not involve what I think about the person who hurt me. 
      
     does/does not involve how I act towards the person who hurt me. 
 
                ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
                       
                does/does not involve how I feel about the person who hurt me. 
   Box 2    
                does/does not involve what I think about the person who hurt me. 
      
     does/does not involve how I act towards the person who hurt me. 
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Please answer the following questions in English. 
 
7.  A.  The definition in question 1 has been suggested as a definition for 
“forgiveness”.  In your opinion, when you “forgive” someone for 
something they have done wrong, does that “forgiveness” happen quickly 
and suddenly, or is it a longer process that begins at some time and ends 
at a later time?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
B.  Does what you wrote in Box 1 happen quickly and suddenly, or is it a  
longer process? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.  The definition in question 1 suggests that you have the right to resent 
someone who unjustly injures you.  Do you believe you have that right?  
Why or why not? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.  The definition in question 1 suggests that someone who unjustly injures 
you on purpose does not deserve your compassion, generosity, and love.  
Do you agree?  Why or why not?   
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Appendix B:  The questionnaire with English translation 
 
(Please note:  This bilingual version of the questionnaire is for reference only 
and only includes questions requiring translation.  The use of the English word 
“forgive” is unavoidable here, even though its use may not be appropriate.) 
 
1.  What Mandarin Chinese word (in 汉字—Chinese characters) would best 
fill in the blank line in the following definition?  Write your answer in Box 1: 
 
              Box 1 
 
                          is a willingness to abandon one’s right to resentment, negative 
judgement, and indifferent behaviour toward one who unjustly injured us, 
while fostering the undeserved qualities of compassion, generosity and 
even love toward him or her.   
2. What Mandarin Chinese word (in 汉字—Chinese characters) would 
best fill in the blank line in the following definition?  Write your answer in Box 2: 
 
         Box 2 
                            is a willingness to allow behavior of which one does not  
approve, even though one has the authority to stop the behavior. 
                 
3.  Write your answer to question 1 in Box 1 below.  Write your answer to 
question 2 in Box 2 below.  Consider the following words, A to O, and for 
each word do the following: 
 
• place a “3” on the line underneath Box 1 if the meaning is 
the same as the word you wrote in Box 1 
 
• or place a “3” on the line underneath Box 2 if the meaning 
is the same as the word you wrote in Box 2.   
 
• Place a “3” on the line in the middle if the meaning is 
somewhere in between.   
 
• If the word has no connection to either Box 1 or Box 2, 
leave the line blank. 
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           Box 1              Box 2 
 
   
 
(The pinyin version of each term is given here, as well as the definition 
according to Wei, 2002 or Wu, 1995—in parentheses.) 
 
A  耐性 _____      _____      _____ 
N4ix=ng patience; endurance 
 
B  饶  _____      _____      _____ 
R2o  forgive 
 
C  接 受 _____      _____      _____ 
Ji5sh$u accept 
 
D  见谅 _____      _____      _____ 
Ji4nli4ng excuse me; forgive me 
 
E  忍受   _____      _____      _____ 
R7nsh$u endure 
 
F  恕罪 _____      _____      _____ 
Sh*z*i pardon an offence; forgive a sin  
 
G  原谅 _____      _____      _____ 
Yu2nli4ng excuse; forgive; pardon 
 
H 谅  _____      _____      _____ 
Li4ng  forgive 
 
I  宽恕 _____      _____      _____ 
Ku1nsh* forgive 
 
J  恕  _____      _____      _____ 
 Sh*  ① forbearance ② forgive; pardon; excuse 
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K  宽容   _____      _____      _____ 
Ku1nr@ng tolerant 
 
L  容忍 _____      _____      _____ 
R@ngr7n tolerate 
 
M  容纳 _____      _____      _____ 
R@ngn4 tolerate 
 
N  饶恕 _____      _____      _____ 
R2osh*    forgive; pardon 
 
O  包容 _____      _____      _____ 
B1or@ng pardon; forgive (tolerant) 
 
P  大度   _____      _____      _____ 
D4d*  magnanimous  
 
4.  Again, write your answer to question 1 in Box 1, and your answer to 
question 2 in Box 2.  For each of the following sayings, indicate if the saying 
is more closely connected to the word in Box 1 or Box 2 by placing a “3” on 
the appropriate line.  The saying may refer to either the presence or the 
absence of the ideas in boxes 1 and 2. 
 
                                                                                         Box 1           Box 2 
 
 
 
A  海纳百川有容乃大   _____      _____ 
The sea can accommodate one hundred rivers; its volume is huge. 
 
B  宰相肚里能撑船    _____      _____ 
A chancellor’s heart is large enough to pole a boat in. 
 
C  大人有大量     _____      _____ 
A great man has great capacity. 
 
D  化干戈为玉帛    _____      _____ 
Convert weapons of warfare into gifts of jade and silk. 
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E  化敌为友     _____      _____ 
Convert an enemy into a friend. 
 
F  夫妻没有隔夜仇    _____      _____
  
A couple doesn’t leave yesterday’s anger until the next morning. 
 
G  虚怀若谷     _____      _____ 
If you’re tolerant, you can bear the most unbearable things. 
 
H  两败俱伤     _____      _____ 
Getting revenge hurts you and your enemy. 
 
I  怨恨在心快乐无缘    _____      _____ 
If you have anger in your heart, you will not be happy. 
 
J  以德报怨不要以牙还牙   _____      _____ 
Do good for evil, not a bite for a bite. 
 
K  忍不能忍之而忍    _____      _____ 
You must bear the most unbearable thing. 
 
L  宽容是一种美德    _____      _____ 
Forgiveness is a good virtue. 
 
M  孰可忍孰不可忍    _____      _____ 
Some things can be forgiven, some cannot. 
 
N  得饶人处且饶人    _____      _____ 
When you can forgive a person, you should. 
 
O  和气生财     _____      _____ 
Forgiveness brings wealth. 
 
P  饶人不是痴汉痴汉不饶人  _____      _____ 
Forgiving a person isn’t foolish; it’s foolish not to forgive a person. 
 
Q  不计前嫌     _____      _____ 
Never remember the wrongdoings of others. 
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R  冤家宜解不宜结    _____      _____ 
Treat your enemy with understanding, not provocation.  
 
S  对敌人的仁慈就是对自己的残忍 _____      _____ 
Showing sympathy to the enemy is being cruel to yourself. 
 
T  此仇不报非君子    _____      _____ 
You’re a coward if you don’t take revenge. 
 
U  君子报仇十年不晚   _____      _____ 
A gentleman takes revenge—ten years is not too late. 
 
V  原谅别人等于默许他下次   
      犯同样的错误    _____      _____ 
Forgiving others gives them the chance to make the same mistake again. 
 
W  唾面自干     _____      _____ 
Let the spit dry on your face.  (A scholar’s reply to a student’s query about what action 
the student should take if someone were to spit in the student’s face.  The scholar felt 
that even wiping the spittle away would be a provocation.) 
 
X  忍是心头一把刀忍字头上一把刀 _____      _____ 
The character “r7n” (“tolerate”) has a “d1o” (“knife”) over one’s “x9n” (“heart”). 
 
Y  是可忍孰不可忍    _____      _____ 
If one’s patience is exhausted, there is no need to forgive. 
 
Z  比陆地大的是海洋     
比海洋大的是天空 
比天空更大的则是人的胸怀  _____      _____ 
The sea is bigger than the land; 
The sky is bigger than the sea; 
Man’s heart is bigger than the sky. 
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5.  If you say the following statements about someone who has hurt you 
unjustly, are you showing what is described in Box 1 or Box 2 from above?  
Place a “3” on the appropriate line. 
   Box 1            Box 2 
 
  
 
[The MEFI items are followed by the corresponding EFI items.  The bracketed initials 
following each item identify the item’s number in the EFI and the subscale of the item 
(A=affect, B=behavior, C=cognition).  All items are positive (P).] 
 
Examples of Affect Items 
 
 A  我对他/她的感觉是温暖的。  _____      _____ 
I feel warm toward him/her.  (01/PA) 
 
B  我对他/她的感觉是好心的。  _____      _____ 
I feel kindness toward him/her.  (03/PA) 
 
C  我对他/她的感觉是正向的。  _____      _____ 
I feel positive toward him/her.  (06/PA) 
 
D  我对他/她的感觉是温柔的。  _____      _____ 
I feel tender toward him/her.  (07/PA) 
 
E  我对他/她的感觉是在乎。  _____      _____ 
I feel caring toward him/her.  (15/PA) 
 
F  我对他/她的感觉是热情。  _____      _____ 
I feel affection toward him/her.  (18/PA) 
 
Examples of Behavior Items 
 
G  对这个人，我现在会或将来 
会表示尊重。    _____      _____ 
c show friendship. (21/PB) 
 
H  对这个人，我现在会或将来会 
当他有困难时，帮助他。  _____      _____ 
Regarding the person, I do or would help. (25/PB) 
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I  对这个人，我现在会或将来会 
体谅他。     _____      _____ 
Regarding the person, I do or would be considerate. (28/PB) 
 
J  对这个人，我现在会或将来会 
当他有困难时，刻意帮他 
一个大忙。    _____      _____ 
Regarding the person, I do or would reach out to him/her. (30/PB) 
 
K  对这个人，我现在会或将来会 
当他有困难时，看他可怜， 
帮他个忙。    _____      _____ 
Regarding the person, I do or would lend him/her a hand. (32/PB) 
 
L  对这个人，我现在会或将来会 
和他建立良好关系。  _____      _____ 
Regarding the person, I do or would establish good relationships with him/her. (35/PB) 
 
M  对这个人，我现在会或将来会 
当他有困难时，只帮他举手 
之劳的小忙。    _____      _____ 
Regarding the person, I do or would do a favour. (37/PB) 
 
N  对这个人，我现在会或将来会 
借钱给他，资助他。  _____      _____ 
Regarding the person, I do or would aid him/her when in trouble. (38/PB) 
 
O  对这个人，我现在会或将来会 
参加他的聚会或活动。  _____      _____ 
Regarding the person, I do or would attend his/her party. (40/PB) 
 
Examples of Cognitive Items 
 
P  我认为他/她是优质的。  _____      _____ 
I think he or she is of good quality. (44/PC) 
 
Q  我认为他/她是值得尊敬的。  _____      _____ 
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I think he or she is worthy of respect. (45/PC) 
   
R  我认为他/她是一个好人。  _____      _____ 
I think he or she is a good person. (50/PC) 
 
S  对于这个人，我祝他幸福。  _____      _____ 
My attitude towards this person is that I wish him/her well. (54/PC) 
 
T  对于这个人，我认为他是一个 
不错的人。    _____      _____ 
My attitude towards this person is that I think favourably of him/her. (56/PC) 
 
U  对于这个人，我希望他成功。 _____      _____ 
My attitude towards this person is that I hope he/she succeeds. (59/PC) 
 
V  对于这个人，我希望他找到幸福。_____      _____ 
My attitude towards this person is that I hope he/she finds happiness. (60/PC) 
 
 
 146
Appendix C:  Responses to questions one and two in Pinyin and Mandarin  
 
Note:  Reponses are listed first in alphabetical and then in tone order (i.e., 1st  
tone: 1; 2nd tone: 2; 3rd tone: 3; and 4th tone: 4) according to the first character of 
each word, so r6n c0, (2nd tone ) for example,  precedes r7n (3rd tone). 
 
 
  1 ~i r6n  爱人 
  2 B1o r@ng   包容 
  3 B@ d4  博大 
  4 B* j= qi2n xi2n 不计前嫌 
  5 B* k7 l- y& 不可理喻 
  6 D2 li4ng  达量 
  7 D4 d*  大度 
  8 D*   度 
  9 D* li4ng  度量 
10 F4ng r8n  放任 
11 F4ng z$ng 放纵 
12 F* m&  父母 
13 Gu4i y=   怪异 
14 H3i n4 b3i chu1n 海纳百川 
15 H3o r6n  好人 
16 Hu$ d2  豁达 
17 J= w3ng b* ji* 既往不咎 
18 Ji4n li4ng   见谅  
19 Ji1o z$ng  骄纵 
20 Ji5 sh$u    接受  
21 K1i m0ng  开明 
22 Ku1n  宽 
23 Ku1n r@ng 宽容  
24 Ku1n sh*   宽恕  
25 L- ji7  理解 
26 Li4ng   谅  
27 Li4ng ji7  谅解 
28 M6i gu1n x= 没关系 
29 M0n zh& q0ng hu2i 民主情怀 
30 M$ x&  默许 
31 N= l2i sh*n sh$u 逆来顺受  
32 Qi1n ji*  迁就 
33 Q-ng bi4n  请便 
34 R4ng b*  让步 
35 R2o   饶  
36 R2o sh*    饶恕  
37 R6n c0  仁慈 
38 R7n  忍 
39 R7n n4i  忍耐 
40 R7n r4ng  忍让 
41 R7n r& f* zh$ng  忍辱负重 
42 R7n sh$u  忍受   
43 R@ng  容 
44 R@ng n4    容纳  
45 R@ng r6n    容忍  
46 Sh4n  善 
47 Sh4n li2ng   善良 
48 Sh*    恕  
49 Sh* z*i   恕罪  
50 X9n xi!ng ku1n ku$ 心胸宽阔 
51 Y- d6 b4o yu4n 以德报怨 
52 Y#u zh= zh9 r6n 有志之人 
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53 Yu2n li4ng   原谅  
54 Z3i xi4ng d* l- n6ng ch5ng chu2n   宰相肚里能撑船 
55 Zh!ng y!ng 中庸 
56 Z$ng r@ng    纵容 
57 Z%n zh$ng    尊重 
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Appendix D:  Selected back-translation results 
 
(Note: For copyright reasons, only those items where back-translation produced 
differences are included here.  The first column lists the original EFI items.  The 
other columns list the translators’ English translations of the MEFI items.)  
 The items in the table are to be inserted in the appropriate statements: 
     1-20: I feel __________________ toward him /her. 
 21-40: Regarding the person, I do or would ________________. 
 41-54: I think he or she is ___________________  
 55-60: My attitude towards this person is that I (feel he or she is) ______. 
 
EFI item Translator 1 Translator 2 Translator 3 Translator 4 
10 resentment 
(NA) 
disgusting  abominable disgust be sick of 
13 cold (NA) indifferent  indifferent indifferent indifferent 
18 affection 
(PA) 
enthusiastic  enthusiastic enthusiastic warm-hearted 
enthusiasm 
21 show 
friendship 
(PB) 
express 
respect  
Show 
respect 
show 
respect 
treat with 
respect 
26 put him/her 
down (NB) 
always be 
against him 
sing a 
different tune 
with him 
sing a 
different tune 
to him 
be against him
30 reach out 
to him/her 
(PB) 
intentionally 
be a great 
help to him 
when he 
meet trouble 
give him a 
big hand 
intentionally 
when he is in 
trouble 
help him with 
intentional 
attention 
when he 
meets 
difficulties 
help him 
purposely 
when he is in 
trouble 
32 lend 
him/her a 
hand (PB) 
do him a 
favour as he 
looks pitiful 
when he is in 
trouble  
Help him out 
of sympathy 
when he is in 
trouble 
help him with 
sympathy 
when he 
meets 
difficulties 
when he is in 
trouble, help 
him because 
you think he is 
very pitiful 
37 do a favour 
(PB) 
do him a 
small favour 
when he is in 
trouble  
just lift a 
finger when 
he is in 
difficulty 
only give him 
a little help 
when he is in 
difficulty 
help him a 
little when he 
gets into 
trouble 
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38 aid him/her 
when in 
trouble 
(PB) 
lend money 
to him , give 
financial aid 
to him 
finance him lend him 
money and 
help him 
financially 
lend money to 
him/ give 
financial aid to 
him 
39 be biting 
when 
talking with 
him/her 
(NB) 
be always in 
a threatening 
manner to 
him  
show 
hostility to 
him 
make 
threatening 
gestures to 
him 
be fierce and 
quarrelsome 
to him 
40 attend 
his/her 
party (PB) 
participate in 
his party or 
activities  
participate in 
his parties or 
other 
activities 
take part in 
his party 
take part in his 
parties or 
activities 
49 immoral 
(NC) 
deserving of 
going down 
hell  
deserving ill deserving of 
falling down 
to hell 
should be cast 
into outer 
darkness 
52 corrupt 
(NC) 
the scum of 
the society  
scum the scum of 
the society 
scum of a 
community 
55 disapprove 
of him/her 
(NC) 
consider him 
as rubbish  
think of him 
as rubbish 
regard him 
as rubbish  
think he is 
rubbish 
58 condemn 
the person 
(NC) 
think he 
deserve to 
die  
wish that he 
was dead 
think he 
deserve to 
die  
think he 
should die 
150 
Appendix E:  The consent form 
 
Consent Form 
 
 I would like to invite you to participate in a study entitled Translating 
“Forgiveness”: The validity of the Mandarin version of the Enright Forgiveness 
Inventory. Please read this form carefully, and feel free to ask questions you 
might have. 
 
Researcher:  Todd Hanson 
 
Department of Educational Foundations  School of Foreign Languages  
College of Education    Xihua Normal University 
University of Saskatchewan, Canada  Nanchong, Sichuan 
E-mail: tjhanson@canada.com   Phone: (0817) 231-2244 
 
Purpose and Procedure: In this study, I will explore the concept of 
“forgiveness” in Mandarin.  Much of my information will come from published 
material, but I will also use a questionnaire to get some opinions from you about 
specific questions.  It will probably take you fifteen to twenty minutes to fill out 
the questionnaire.  Most of it will be in English, but parts of it will be in Mandarin.   
 
Potential Risks:  I am required by the university to describe any risks or 
dangers you may face if you participate in this study.  I cannot think of any risks 
in a study of this kind.  I will simply ask you to answer questions about meaning 
on the questionnaire. 
 My hope is that the information you provide will help me to write a thesis 
that will bring both Chinese and Westerners to a deeper understanding of the 
important topic of forgiveness.  
Your completed questionnaire will be stored at the University of 
Saskatchewan for five years, but no one will be able to identify which 
questionnaire is yours.  
 
Confidentiality:  In my thesis, I may quote some of your answers directly, but I 
will not identify you by name.  Your name will never be connected to your 
questionnaire.  This consent form requires your signature, but these forms will 
be stored separately from your responses.  Please do not put your name on 
your questionnaire.  
 
Right to Withdraw:  I welcome your participation in this study, but you may 
certainly choose not to participate.  If you choose not to participate after 
completing the questionnaire, let me know and I will not use your responses and 
I will destroy your questionnaire. 
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 You may choose not to answer some of the questions on the 
questionnaire.  In such a case, I will use your responses to the other questions. 
 
Questions: If you have any questions concerning the study, now or at a later 
time, please feel free to ask.  This study has been approved by the University of 
Saskatchewan Behavioural Sciences Research Ethics Board on May 7, 2004.  
Any questions regarding your rights as a participant may be addressed to that 
committee through the Office of Research Services (011-306-966-2084).  You 
may call collect.    
My thesis will be completed by December, 2004.  If you are interested in 
discussing my thesis after that date, I will be happy to talk to you about it. 
 
If you are interested in participating in this study, please sign your name below 
to indicate that you are willing to do so.   
 
Consent to Participate:  I have read and understood the description provided 
above; I have been provided with an opportunity to ask questions and my 
questions have been answered satisfactorily.  I consent to participate in the 
study described above, understanding that I may withdraw this consent at any 
time.  A copy of this consent form has been given to me for my records.   
 
 
                                                                         _____________________                          
(Signature of Participant)          (Date) 
  
 
___________________________________                                                                  
(Signature of Researcher) 
 
